

“The Future Ain’t What It Used to Be”:

Europe, America and the New International Landscape

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Thank you, Ulrich Bopp. I want to express my appreciation especially to you, for you have been a tremendous catalyst for transatlantic relations. Through Ulrich Bopp’s leadership the Robert Bosch Foundation has sparked a broad and dynamic network of Germans and Americans committed to our partnership. It is a particular pleasure to be with him here tonight.

It is also a pleasure to be in Stuttgart because of my personal associations with Baden Württemberg. Not only did I study in Konstanz, I continue a sister city relationship with my friend Mayor Rudolf Forcher that brings young Americans to the town of Bad Waldsee and young Waldseer to Minnesota. And as a “DaimlerChrysler Fellow” I feel right at home.

To begin, let me confirm for you the skepticism many Europeans share about the seriousness of American culture by admitting that our greatest philosophers tend to be our baseball players. And perhaps I will confirm the skepticism some of you may share of my own seriousness when I tell you that I believe that Dan Quisenberry, a pitcher for the Kansas City Royals, really summed up best the way we all viewed the future during the Cold War.

"I have seen the future," he said, "and it is much like the present -- only longer."

I believe Quisenberry was right. This was the prevailing view - that notion that the competition between East and West would somehow continue, that Germany would remain split, that Russia and America were enduring enemies. And even as we tried to overcome Europe’s divisions, two generations of people planned their futures on the hard rock of the Berlin Wall itself -- on the assumption that the Wall, and the world it represented, was here to stay.

Suddenly, without warning, that Wall came down; the crisp, clean lines of the Cold War turned into the abstract colors of a Jackson Pollock painting; and a lot of people on both sides of that vanishing divide found themselves superbly trained to deal with a world that no longer existed.

Even today, the fall of the Berlin Wall remains the most potent symbol of open societies and open markets. But when walls come down for families, friends, goods and services, they also come down for hatred and prejudice. Europe, whole and free, still beckons. But more Europeans died violently in the decade after the Berlin Wall fell than during the almost three decades it was standing. Our early euphoria blinded us to the fact that our brave new world did not just swept aside prevailing conflicts, it also ushered in new ones.

Then came the attacks of September 11. If the fall of the Berlin Wall was the triumph of globalization’s positive elements, the fall of the World Trade Tower was the shuddering response by its darker forces.

Much now seems different, and an even greater American philosopher, Yankee baseball player Yogi Berra, provides further wisdom.

"The future," he said, "ain't what it used to be."

How should we now think about this world and our role in it? It's a big question. With your indulgence I'd like to tackle it in the spirit of King Alfonso X of Spain, who in the 13th century commented that had he been present at the Creation he would have had some useful hints for the better organization of the universe.

Let me also add that I am acutely aware of some German and American differences in approaching such questions. Most of my German friends usually want to understand the overall conceptual framework – the Gesamtkonzept -- before they are ready to move ahead. For many of my American friends, life is case by case.

These differences were best illustrated by a conversation in the early 1980s between then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and U.S. Ambassador to Germany Arthur Burns. The Chancellor summoned Burns one day and asked him to lay out America's Gesamtkonzept for East-West relations, how was Washington going to deal with all of these intermediate range missiles, Soviet adventurism, human rights, gas pipelines, and so on.

Burns responded immediately. "I would be happy to do so," he said. "Would you like the Gesamtkonzept from this week or from last week?"

A secret to German-American success, of course, is that when we have been at our best we have been able to place case-by-case decisions within a broader strategy. We face this challenge today.

Of course, no single concept, no matter how Gesamt, can capture today's reality. The world we live in is far too complicated to fit onto an Aufkleber. Our interests are too broad, our challenges too diverse.

But case by case foreign policy is equally inadequate. Our publics need bearings by which to judge international events and to understand our respective roles and responsibilities in the world. Without such bearings, decisions are ad hoc. Support is harder to mobilize. And political perceptions of our interests are more likely to be driven by fleeting preoccupations, media headlines, partisan politics, or special interests.

In the United States we have been heartened and humbled by the tremendous courage and tenacity of New York City's fire fighters. They are true heroes. But we shortchange both our heroes and our victims if we rely on a fire brigade foreign policy, rushing here and there to douse one hot spot after another. That was the danger we faced until September 11. We were squabbling so much about bananas and beef that it seemed we had forgotten entirely about our larger purposes together.

Since then much has changed. Americans have been truly moved by the very genuine and spontaneous outpouring of German and European solidarity. Right after the attack, an eight year old German girl wrote a prayer; her father took it to Ground Zero in New York:

Herr, wir sind sehr erschrocken.
In Amerika ist schreckliches geschehen.
Terroranschläge haben zwei Hochhaustürme in New York zerstört.
Teile des Pentagon brannten.
Tausend von Menschen sind tot, sie sind unter den Trümmern begraben.
Ihre Angehörigen sind verzweifelt.
Wir trauern mit.
Herr, wir bitten dich um Frieden in der Welt.
Hilf, das die Verantwortlichen richtig entscheiden.
Herr hilf uns.

Once again, Americans and Europeans are proving that we can unite with courage and determination to threats posed by dangerous and determined foes. My question is whether we can summon those same qualities in response to the opportunities born of this tragedy and adapt our partnership to the challenges of this new world -- for history will ultimately judge us not only in terms of how well we managed crises or responded to disaster, but also how well we positioned ourselves to shape the future.

Understanding those opportunities means first understanding what changed -- and what did not change -- on September 11.

What changed on September 11 was not our vulnerability to terrorism but our understanding of it. The greatest shock was perhaps not even the sheer, staggering loss of life, but the evil, hate and fanaticism behind it.

Americans today are experiencing the daily sense of insecurity that Germans felt during the days of Baader Meinhof, the Spanish with the Basques, the British and Irish with the IRA. But on September 11 a line was crossed for which even European experience with terrorism does not prepare us. In the past, international terrorists typically executed limited attacks so as not to undermine political and financial support for their causes. They wanted maximum media exposure, not maximum casualties. Today's terrorists have no such qualms. Their capacity to kill is limited only by the power of their weapons. Their goal is not to win minds. It is to destroy societies. They have brutalized us into an age of catastrophic terror.

September 11 makes vividly plausible what until now was known but considered theoretical: the detonation of weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption on European or American soil by states, groups or even individuals. The greatest potential threat we face remains nuclear missiles launched from a prominent nation. But that threat has receded. Our more likely threats are biological weapons in the mail or a spray can, chemical weapons in a ventilation system or a subway, or nuclear or radiological weapons in the back of a truck or the hold of a ship, delivered by a group -- or a person -- with no return address. Osama bin Laden has said that acquiring weapons of mass destruction is "a religious duty." Nuclear-weapons related documents were found in an Al Qaeda safe house in Afghanistan. A member of al Qaeda has boasted of plans for a "Hiroshima" against America.

The threat of terrorism and the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction are now joined. Together, they are our worst nightmare.

On September 11 we found ourselves at war. We have not chosen this war, it has chosen us. Here language can be a barrier to understanding. For most Germans, the term "war" recalls the utter destruction of German cities and countryside. Since Germany was not attacked directly on September 11, I can understand the debate here whether this is really a war or more a horrific crime. But for most Americans, this is a war in two senses. First, it is a war in the truest meaning of the word. The ruins of the World Trade Center evoke memories of German and European cities. We were directly attacked, we are at war. Second, we are waging this war on terrorism as we have waged domestic "wars" on drugs, on crime, on poverty -- as a way to mobilize our vast and diverse society in a multidimensional campaign of unknown duration.

We are waging this war, this campaign, against a network rather than a nation, although some nations are involved. Our adversary is not just those responsible for this attack or even the states that supported them. It is a system of international terrorism, built up over decades, whose aspirations, organization, and scope have changed dramatically over the past ten years. Al Qaeda and Lebanese Hizballah, whose presence reaches six continents, lead the way. But other terrorist organizations, from the Palestinian group Hamas to the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers, maintain cells far from the lands of their grievance.

Our enemies include elusive individuals, shadowy organizations and hidden financial links. They

are both more lethal and harder to detect and predict. The anthrax attacks in the United States have blurred traditional distinctions between domestic and international terror. Rogue terrorist well-wishers can play off of one another and enhance the mass disruption they each can cause.

On September 11 the transatlantic partnership shifted from a relationship between protector and protected to a true mutual defense community. Just before I left for Stuttgart I stepped out of my home in Maryland to see a rather remarkable sight -- a NATO AWACS plane, most likely manned by Germans and other Europeans, patrolling the night skies over Washington. We are truly in this together. Today, our focus is on defending America. But there could be an attack on Europe tonight -- or tomorrow. Al-Qaeda planned major operations in Britain, France, Germany and Italy as well as the US. We now know that one of the terrorists who crashed into the World Trade Center once flew a precise flight plan over unprotected nuclear installations and key political and economic institutions along the Rhein and Ruhr.

On September 11 we also learned that the openness that is our greatest strength can also be used against us. This was not only an attack on freedom, it was, as The Economist notes, an "attack through freedom." The terrorists not only penetrated our security, they exploited our civil liberties, our education systems, our social services, and the transportation and communications infrastructure of our free societies to advance their murderous ends.

We will continue to face dangers derived from the interconnected points of vulnerability that accompany the free flow of people and ideas, goods and services, as well as the complex systems on which our way of life depends - global electronic financial networks, networked information systems, economies dependent on imported fossil fuels.

Do the events of September 11 provide a new framework for international politics, do they generate a new Gesamtkonzept to help us understand our world and our role in it? In and of themselves, they do not. The issues of September 10 did not disappear on September 12. There are many issues we would have had to face even if September 11 had never happened. The lines of Bertolt Brecht continue to be true:

"New Ages don't begin all at once.
My grandfather lived in the new age.
My grandson will still live in the old.
New meat is eaten with old forks.
From the new antennae come the old stupidities.
Wisdom is passed from mouth to mouth."

The world of September 10 -- and the world of December 11 -- is a world torn by the positive and negative forces of globalization. September 11 brutally affirmed the September 10 reality that we live in a world in which our well-being is increasingly influenced by legal and illegal flows of people, money and weapons, technology, toxins and terror, drugs and disease. We characterize these phenomena as "global," but their impact is local. They are impersonal forces with very personal consequences. The dangers they pose to our way of life are both more tangible and more unpredictable than was the Cold War danger of nuclear conflagration.

Events since September 11 -- both the anthrax attacks and the cloning of human cells in the United States -- affirm that, for better or for worse, biology is likely to be the defining science of the 21st century, much as physics was for the 20th century. Advances in biotechnology, advanced food processing, and pharmaceuticals promise untold benefits for humankind. But they also are steadily increasing the ease with which both terrorists and states can manufacture lethal biological agents and do so all over the world.

In this new world, nature itself can be an enemy. Diseases that in earlier times might have remained local curses now have global range. Twenty well-known diseases--including tuberculosis, malaria, and cholera--have reemerged or spread geographically since 1973, often in

more virulent and drug-resistant forms. And at least 30 previously unknown disease agents have been identified, including HIV/AIDS, Ebola, Hepatitis C, and Nipah virus, for which no cures are available. 26 million people have AIDS; 22 million people have already died. If we don't turn the trend around there will be 100 million AIDS cases in five years – the worst pandemic since the Plague swept Europe 600 years ago.

During the past fifty years the human species caused more change to the planet than it had in the previous 10,000 years. It took thousands of generations for the earth's population to reach 2 billion; it will take one lifetime to go from 2 to 6 billion. Rapid population growth, stratospheric ozone depletion, tropical deforestation, migration and humanitarian crises, regional water pollution and acid rain all pose dangers to human health and national wealth. They are ignorant of political and ideological borders. They generate millions of refugees. They destabilize governments and cause violence. We will either deal with them together or they will not be dealt with at all.

The economic opportunities that have accompanied global growth have lifted more people out of poverty in the last thirty years than were ever lifted out in all of human history. And yet the gap between rich and poor continues to grow. The result is a profound sense of technological backwardness, deprivation and even hopelessness that generates support for extremism, notably in Muslim countries. Nearly half the world's population lives on 2 Euros a day, a billion live on one Euro a day, a billion and a half never get a clean glass of water. Every minute a woman dies of childbirth and a child dies of HIV/AIDS. That's a recipe for explosion.

Most threats to peace and stability today arise from conflicts within states rather than between them. Most are not new; many are very old. They are not "clashes of civilizations" but fratricides that often pit neighbors from the same religions or familiar cultures against each other. Left unattended in today's globalizing world, these often latent hatreds can be hijacked by demagogues and married to modern weapons of mass destruction to threaten not only our welfare but our very existence. Fortunately, the tragedy of September 11 has also highlighted very real opportunities of interest among the Great Powers. None of the major powers wants to be vulnerable to these shadowy groups or darker global forces. None have the means to resist alone. As a result, there are greater incentives and lower barriers to Great Power cooperation than at any time in the past 150 years. Moreover, for the first time in human history, most people on this planet live under governments of their own choosing. The advance of democracy has contributed enormously to our security and well-being. Not all of the world's dictators are our opponents. But all of our opponents are dictators.

Understanding and then managing this combustible cocktail of old and new is our common challenge. The potential significance of September 11 is less that it suddenly heralded a completely new world than that it may have destroyed under a million tons of steel and glass the complacency with which we were confronting the world of September 10. I say "may" because it is still an open question.

Seen in this way, the war on terrorism – in its broadest sense of a multidimensional campaign -- is about far more than hunting down terrorists. It is also about more than threat or opportunity. It is about the obligation we now have to recast our partnership, and with it the international system.

I believe that we can begin to assume this obligation if we understand not only what did change on September 11, but what did not change -- and that is the core role of the transatlantic community.

Events since September 11 should have reaffirmed to us how essential our transatlantic community is to our freedom, our prosperity, our security. In recent years we seemed to have forgotten this.

That's why it may be useful to recall a few facts before we consider a new Atlanticism. We are

each other's most significant military, economic and political partners. Our alliance is the most effective military coalition in human history. We are home to the world's most successful democracies and the principal custodians of its liberal values.

Together we are the main engine of the world economy. The Euro and the Dollar are the world's key currencies. Together we comprise 90 percent of the world's humanitarian assistance. Our \$1.5 trillion economic relationship - the world's largest -- employs more than 14 million people on both sides of the Atlantic who enjoy high wages, high labor and environmental standards, and open, largely non-discriminatory access to each other's markets. Our companies invest more in each other's economies than they do in the entire rest of the world put together. There is more European investment in Texas than all of American investment in Japan. Despite the rhetorical flourishes one hears about the Asian century, over the past eight years American companies invested 10 times more in the Netherlands than they did in China. European companies account for over 60 percent of all U.S. jobs created by international investors, and Europe is the most profitable place in the world for American companies operating abroad. Two-thirds of American corporate international R&D is in Europe. Together we are the nexus of global intellectual capital and technological innovation. We have no opposing strategic purposes. The differences we have are over secondary interests and tactics.

The process of globalization is more advanced over the Atlantic than anywhere on earth. Our citizens are interacting so closely that we have transcended so-called "foreign" relations. We have moved into a new arena of transatlantic Innenpolitik, in which specific social and economic concerns often jump formal borders and override national policies. As Germany's former Ambassador to the United States, Jürgen Chrobog, has said, "Die gemeinsame atlantische Zivilisation unterscheidet unser Verhältnis von jedem anderen Verhältnis zwischen zwei Weltregionen. Das schliesst Unterschiede nicht aus. Gleiche Werte – etwa die individuelle Freiheit – werden in Europa und Amerika nicht selten unterschiedlich interpretiert und gewichtet... Wir bleiben [aber] füreinander unverzichtbare, alternativlose Partner."

Our potential will be further enhanced by Europe's continuing enlargement to comprise a population of half a billion people, with a territory stretching from the Atlantic to Russia and perhaps beyond, from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean.

No one has been more clear about this than Secretary of State Powell, who, when asked recently why Russian President Putin would turn to the transatlantic community, said that "It is clear that President Putin understands that Russia's future primarily lies to the West. That's the source of inspiration, that's the source of technology, it's the source of capital, it's the source of debt relief, it's the source of security."

In short, America's relations with Europe remain distinct from our relations with any other country or group of countries in this one essential sense: when we agree, our partnership is the drivewheel of progress on almost every world-scale issue. When we are at odds, we are the global brake.

That's why our answer to this new world cannot be that we should do less together; it is that we must do more together. We must widen our horizons and lift our aspirations.

The last century taught us the hard way that we need each other. When we stood apart, we faced depression and war. When we stood together, we prevailed and prospered.

After World War II our partnership focused on rehabilitating Germany and rebuilding western Europe, and defending the continent from Soviet aggression. After the Cold War we expanded our partnership beyond Cold War lines to encompass Europe's eastern democracies. After the Balkans Wars we have been focused on transforming southeastern Europe from a primary source of instability to an integral part of our community -- critical work that must continue. Now, in this new era, we must focus our attention --together-- on the promise and dangers of globalization.

This new Atlanticism is first and foremost a vision of goals and means, not of institutions and bureaucracies. The vision is as simple as it is sweeping. It is of a Europe whole and free, in tandem with the United States, in a new Atlantic Community that is a force for progress in the world. It focuses less on what Americans should do for Europeans in Europe and more on what Americans and Europeans are prepared to do together in the wider world. It is more equal, more global – and more effective. Its vitality is uncoupled from old Cold War references to Russia. In fact, a key goal is to seek ways to associate and include a democratic Russia.

This new partnership does not mean an American withdrawal from European affairs. Rather, it would give the U.S. role in Europe – which remains vital – new meaning and staying power, because it would be tied to clear transatlantic interests around the world.

This global new deal will require us first, to advance a two-pronged campaign that fights terrorism and projects stability, particularly in the region I call Greater Southwest Asia; second, to engage together with Russia and other new partners in a grand new alliance to secure our future; and third, to change our own way of acting – and more importantly, our way of thinking -- to cope with our new challenges.

Let me outline each of these in turn.

Continuing the fight against terrorism still means, first and foremost, eliminating Osama Bin Laden and his network. But this is but the opening engagement of what must be a continuing and relentless worldwide campaign. The coalition of states assembled against al-Qaeda is unprecedented. But if we are to seize the opportunity to create a safer world, we must shape something more sustainable than the ad hoc alliance against Osama and the Taliban.

Al-Qaeda has alliances with many groups and cells in more than 50 countries. Striking militarily at them everywhere is not a solution. A broader strategy must improve domestic preparedness, dry up the money for terrorism, harass and disrupt terrorist communications, and pressure countries to stop providing safe haven. Success will require comprehensive cooperation among intelligence officials, police, diplomats, customs and financial institutions. Victory will be piecemeal and incremental. In President Bush's words, it will require a "patient accumulation of success." Our efforts must be guided by prevention rather than revenge, and our goal to reduce the probability and severity of future attacks. This phase is likely to be more difficult than the first phase, and the coalition is likely to experience severe stresses and strains.

The struggle of ideas is critical. It begins within our own Community -- with the insinuation that the U.S. itself was responsible for the evil that befell it, and that our responses to terror are somehow worse than terrorism itself. According to this view, the only morally permitted response is to reconsider the policies that the terrorists claim to be attacking. We bomb Iraq, we support Israel, we are the allies of repressive Arab regimes. According to this view, we throw our weight -- and our virtues -- around in such an intolerable manner that we shouldn't be surprised that terrorism is the answer. And anyway -- force never solves anything.

Really? Let's leave aside all the cartoon images of American wickedness that accompany these excuses, and address the argument itself. I will be among the first to acknowledge that we Americans have our own brutalities to answer for – as well as the brutalities of those we have supported. But Americans and Europeans together also have to answer for those times when we failed to stand up to oppression and murder – when we failed to act early and forthrightly against Hitler or Stalin, when we failed to act early and decisively against mass murder in Kampuchea, in Bosnia, in Rwanda, our maddening failures to stop the violence in the Middle East. And when we did stand up -- against Iraq, for example -- one can speculate about what might have happened had we not. Without military opposition from the United States it is reasonable to believe that the dictator who has gassed his own people and slaughtered 200,000 Kurds would simply continue his slaughters, as he has promised to do. And he may yet.

One could also agree that some of our policies need reviewing, as I will suggest. But none of this excuses terrorism or makes it morally understandable. The only possible response to ideological fanatics and suicidal holy warriors is implacable opposition. As the American publicist Michael Berman has written, those who trade solidarity with the victims for a moment of Schadenfreude are not simply making excuses for terrorism, they have joined the ranks of terror's supporters.

We must not only define at home what this campaign is really about, we must define it in the minds of 1 billion Muslims. We must be clear that there is no war against Islam. Western interventions in the Persian Gulf and in Somalia saved hundreds of thousands of Muslim lives. In the Balkans, when Serb nationalists invoked a medieval Christian zeal and set out to massacre Bosnian Muslims, and then turned to massacre and expel Kosovar Muslims, the United States and Europe went to war – twice -- on the Muslim side.

This seems to have done nothing to improve America's reputation in the world of radical Islamists and Arab nationalists – or their apologists in our Community. This is because in their eyes our crime, our real crime, is to be ourselves. Our crime is to exude the dynamism of a free, democratic culture. Our crime is less what we do than who we are. In their eyes the civilian victims in New York weren't really innocent, because they enjoyed the tainted fruits of Western oppression. In their eyes the crime of millions of our citizens is to demonstrate on a daily basis that liberal society can thrive and that antiliberal society cannot. This is the whip that drives the antiliberal movements to their fury. We must act prudently in the Middle East; but no amount of prudence will forestall that kind of hostility.

No, this is not a clash of civilizations, but a clash between civilized people anywhere – be they Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, or anything else – and an extremism that cloaks itself in the language of one of the world's great religions even as it betrays that religion's most fundamental teachings. This war is not between Islam and the West, but between prejudice and tolerance, between those who would open societies and those who would shut them down.

No, this cannot be a war against Islam, because Islam is now part of who we are. 12 million Muslims are citizens of the European Union. Islam is America's fastest growing religion. Over the next decade there will be more Muslim Americans than Jewish Americans. The millions of active, articulate and demonstrably free American and European Muslims are living proof that Islam can survive and thrive in a liberal environment and that fervent believers do not have to turn in radical directions simply to uphold their religious identity. There is nothing more challenging to the fanatics. That is why hundreds of American, European and other Muslims were killed in the World Trade Center.

No, this is not a clash of civilizations, but a struggle within Islam itself – a struggle between terrorists trying to hijack Islam and those who seek to live by its teachings. As Akbar Ahmed, a prominent scholar of Islam, has remarked, "The actions of the hijackers may have had nothing to do with Islam, but the consequences and causes of their actions has everything to do with how and where Islam will be going in the 21st century."

These difficulties will continue unless we are prepared, in addition to waging the direct campaign against terrorism, to shape the larger environment in which the terrorists operate. It requires a comprehensive transatlantic strategy to the region I will call Greater Southwest Asia.

A circle – with its center in Tehran – that has a diameter roughly matching the length of the continental United States covers a region that encompasses 75 percent of the world's population, 60 percent of its GNP, and 75 percent of its energy resources. Greater Southwest Asia is the region of the world where unsettled relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, fragile regimes, and deadly combinations of technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast, relatively contiguous energy field upon which Western prosperity depends. The main threat to German, European, American security is no longer invasion across the Fulda Gap but rather wanton

destruction of our societies or irretrievable damage to our extended interests generated by turmoil in this region. Choices made there could determine the shape of the 21st century – whether weapons of mass destruction will be unleashed upon mass populations; whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia will become reliable sources of energy; whether the opium harvests of death in Afghanistan and Burma are shut down; whether Russia's borderlands will become stable and secure democracies; whether Israel and its neighbors can live together in peace; and whether the great religions of the world can work together.

In the past, we have approached this region through a series of policy boxes – the Middle East peace process was treated separately from the issues of energy, which were treated separately from concerns about proliferation, which were treated separately from approaches to North Africa, which were treated separately from our approaches to Iran and Iraq. Globalization has erased these lines, and neither the United States nor Europe can manage these challenges on its own. We must devise a new transatlantic strategy to this region that is more than a series of compartmentalized policies.

This is a long term effort. We cannot hope to transform this turbulent region into an area of democratic stability and prosperity anytime soon. But we can act more successfully together to defend common interests, to dampen the negative trends that are gaining momentum, to encourage positive trends, to control crises—and if need be, to win wars. I can only touch on some elements, such as the need for a high priority effort to reduce our reliance on Persian Gulf oil. But three aspects bear some discussion.

The first is a closer look at conditions in Arab world. A number of Arab states friendly to or aligned with the Atlantic Community have played an undeniable role in the formation of fanatical groups like al-Qaeda. Usually it is our support for Israel, our supposed abandonment of the Palestinians or the U.S. military presence close to Islam's holiest places that are cited as causes for Islamic terrorism. But the most important driver of Islamic anger is the failure of many so-called moderate Islamic states to create modern governments responsive to the needs of their people and viable civil societies where even minimal levels of debate and democracy are tolerated.

The terrorists who perpetrated the September 11 attacks were well-to-do Egyptians and Saudis with excellent German and American educations. They were the products of authoritarian systems that squelch legitimate political activity and drive political discussion to the mosques and madrassas. The result? While we are busy with peacemaking, they are busy deflecting their opponents onto us.

There is another path, and that is democracy. When Islam is part of a pluralistic, democratic society, it thrives like any other religion. The world's most populous democracy – India – is also home to the second-largest Muslim community in the world. One does not hear of Islamic fanaticism there. Perhaps India's multiethnic, pluralist, free-market democracy has something to do with the fact that India's Muslims are not blaming America for their problems or flying suicide planes into the Taj Mahal.

We are dealing with millions of people who can only be persuaded, not forced. The transformation of large parts of the culture of the Arab and Islamic worlds can be achieved, if at all, only after many years or even decades of struggle. It will be a struggle of ideas – freedom versus certitude; change versus stability; diversity versus purity and conformity.

In the past, poverty and political alienation drove young people to communism or to Nasserism. Today, they turn to extremist Islam. This is why the transatlantic community must change its ways. As long as oil flowed and regimes were stable, we closed our eyes to the glaring injustices within the Arab world. No more. It's time for a change.

A related priority is to redouble our efforts at Israeli-Palestinian peace. On their own, Ariel Sharon and Yasser Arafat cannot break out of their violent downward spiral. Europe and America agree

that the Palestinians must have a viable state. We agree that Israel's humiliating occupation should end for the benefit of Palestinians and Israelis alike. But we must also insist that the Palestinians end the terrorism, violence and incitement of the Intifada. Why aren't we demanding that the Saudis recognize the Jewish state in return for our recognition of a Palestinian state? And when we demand that the Palestinians stop their anti-Israel incitement, why don't we demand the same of the Egyptians and Saudis who own or control the most influential media in the Arab world, remarkable for their anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism? Momentum towards an elusive settlement will depend in large measure upon consistent and patient efforts by the transatlantic community. The alternative may be too horrible for most to contemplate.

If we are to drain the sea of people in which terrorists swim – to borrow an image from Mao Zedong – we must address the misery, the poverty, the disease facing billions in this region and beyond. This will require commitments far beyond what we are doing today, particularly in the area of foreign assistance.

The imperative to do so is only partly related to the fight against terrorism, but the new environment provides an opportunity to promote development as security by other means. Here Europe has been a leader. But in the United States foreign assistance programs collapsed with the Cold War. Our foreign assistance program today is essentially focused on Egypt and Israel. Measured as a share of national income, we are the world's leading deadbeat.

There is a new rhetoric in Washington about foreign assistance. The President has underscored that the war is not only a military one for also a war for global prosperity, and that U.S. security requires that the world's impoverished children be fed, educated and given health care. No one disagrees with eradicating poverty as long as it remains an empty concept. But neither the White House nor the Congress have turned this new rhetoric into a new reality. They voted a \$1.6 trillion tax cut without raising one penny for foreign assistance. They are voting now on a \$100 billion stimulus package without raising one penny for foreign assistance. Recession could further dampen efforts at reform. The result? We deny ourselves a tool to reorient impoverished societies toward modernity and democracy -- and let fundamentalist cash fill the void in Islamic parts of Africa and throughout Greater Southwest Asia.

We don't have to do much, relative to our income, to accomplish an enormous amount of good. The Marshall Plan cost the American taxpayer more than 2 percent of GNP for several years. Now we don't even provide one-twentieth of that. If the U.S. raised its aid budget this year from less than one-tenth of one percent of GNP to two-tenths, we'd have an extra \$10 billion to fight disease and to provide education, clean water and other vital needs.

As I said, this is a particular American problem, and European leadership is essential. But I suggest that you also find ways to close the stunning gap that has emerged between huge EU aid commitments, which look good on paper, and the years, not months, it often takes before a pledge of assistance actually reaches its intended target. Poverty must also be addressed by Arab states themselves, after all, in the Arab region some of the richest countries in the world live next door to some of the poorest. Perhaps an Arab Marshall Plan, funded by the oil-rich Gulf states, could address the Arab poverty gap.

There are many elements to the foreign assistance debate. Cash alone will not transform the plight of the poor if their own governments do not address issues of corruption and bureaucracy, the rule of law and respect for private property, or if developed and developing nations alike do not lower barriers to trade and investment. Suffice it to say that September 11 has given us an opportunity to reinvigorate this aspect of our transatlantic agenda – if we seize the moment.

These issues, in turn, require greater convergence in our approaches to both failed states and rogue states, in this region and beyond. One lesson of September 11 is that if failed states are allowed to fester, they can become sanctuaries or even agents for terrorist networks, organized criminals and drug traffickers. Afghanistan is a dramatic example, and rebuilding will be

necessary to root out terrorism within its borders. The Petersberg talks on a political settlement are a good start.

But our 21st century world is littered with Afghanistans, and when these states fail, their neighbors and often the global community are faced with refugee flows, ethnic or civil conflict, and political disintegration. Together we have a compelling interest in working with other partners and international organizations to build states that can look after the needs of their people and provide security within their borders. Europeans have recognized this need for some time; there are signs that the Bush Administration is waking up to this reality as well. But that remains to be seen.

On the other hand, if September 11 underscored the need to deal with failed states, it equally underscored that we must be prepared to confront rogue states that seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction or provide know-how or materials to terrorists. Today, this is our most likely security threat. We should unite behind a common doctrine that makes clear that any regime that uses nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the transatlantic community or its interests, or that supplies such weapons or know-how to terrorists, will be removed from power.

We are not likely to have much time to debate this proposition, because we have urgent business with Iraq. Saddam Hussein has the motive, the means and the psychopathology to provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorist networks that are the most likely source of a future and truly devastating blow to Europe or America. Already by 1995 Iraq had produced more than 29,000 liters of biological agents, including anthrax and botulism toxins and had at least 300 biological bombs. He has used toxic weapons in the past, both on his enemies and on his own people. He continues his work today. Our sanctions regime has disintegrated; Saddam feeds his WMD program rather than his people. UN inspectors know he has loaded biological and chemical weapons onto missiles; German intelligence estimates that he will have nuclear weapons within three years. The US and Europe should look beyond current efforts to find ways to help the Iraqi people. But there must be a highly visible roll-back in Iraqi missile efforts and development of weapons of mass destruction. We must forge a new international consensus against Saddam's efforts, sanctioned by the United Nations, and present him with a true choice. If he does not let the inspectors in, we will force him out. If he provides know-how or materials to terrorist groups, we will force him out. Smart sanctions or smart bombs. He can take his pick.

A global Atlantic Community would give us a potent mechanism to engage Russia in a grand new partnership. For most of the past century, fear, tyranny and isolation kept Russia from the transatlantic mainstream. But now, new patterns are taking hold. The concerns that unite us outweigh those that divide us. To the extent that President Putin has made an historic decision in favor of incorporating Russia into Western and global institutions, we should seize the opportunity. We have two related priorities. One is to encourage the efforts of the Russian people to transform their political, economic and social institutions. The other is to make the world safer.

Inattention to the fragility of Russia's democracy would be a big mistake. Russia cannot become a complete part of this global Atlantic Community until it becomes fully democratic. Capitalism will not thrive without the entrenchment of democracy and the rule of law. Backsliding is still a danger. That is why we must encourage the efforts of the Russian people to transform their country by reaching beyond Moscow's Ring Road to new generations in the boardrooms, shop floors, editorial offices and universities of a new Russia. And that is why we must clearly state our concerns about Chechnya, freedom of the press, religious tolerance, and the rule of law.

But we cannot fight the two-headed monster of terrorism joined to weapons of mass destruction without partnership with Moscow. Undercutting this essential cooperation could leave us less secure, not more. That is why our new framework must include attention to a stable, long-term partnership. Together, we should seek ways to make Russia's integration more attainable. This could include accelerated efforts toward Russian membership in the WTO, lower trade barriers to Russian imports, and a new level of joint Russia-NATO consultation and decision-making on

selected areas of common concern, including joint defensive efforts against terrorism or weapons of mass destruction.

Earlier this year President Bush announced that he wants to replace the existing strategic architecture of arms control and nuclear weapons agreements with a new strategic “framework” for the 21st century. Updating these policies is long overdue. But one nation, acting alone, cannot possibly build a lasting strategic framework to which all other nations submit. A new framework must do more than simply cut old nuclear weapons in favor of new missile defenses. What is needed is a more comprehensive and integrated approach that includes expanded arms control efforts, better antiterrorist efforts and nonproliferation measures, joint efforts to cope with both failed and rogue states, and new, balanced defense capabilities. And it must seek to include new partners, particularly Russia and China.

That is why I endorse ideas, such as that advanced by Karl Kaiser and others, to expand the Group of 8 to include China as the core of a new Global Alliance for Mutual Security. As a first order of business the coalition must engage on a new understanding of strategic stability. For thirty years two superpowers preserved stability despite their animosity because they felt equally at risk, they shared the view that the prospect of suicide would deter anyone from actually using weapons of mass destruction, and they were willing to negotiate certain rules of the road together and with other nations.

Today, all three premises have vanished. Other nuclear powers have emerged – and the rules of their road are unclear. Terrorists aren’t deterred by suicide, and they’re not at the negotiating table. They have nothing to protect and nothing to lose. In short, Cold War deterrence will not work as it once did, and in some cases it will not work at all.

A new conception of strategic stability must weave what have been separate strands -- the fight against terrorism, nuclear force posture, nonproliferation, and efforts at defense -- into a comprehensive defense against weapons of mass destruction – in any form, from any source, on any vehicle, whether triggered by intent or accident, by a rogue state or a terrorist group. Each of these strands influences the others. That’s why they must be considered not separately, but jointly. A new coalition should advance a broad-based effort at protection in depth that includes four mutually reinforcing elements: Prevention, deterrence, defense, and societal protection.

The first element is prevention. When the Soviet Empire broke apart, it left behind 30,000 nuclear warheads and enough highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make 60,000 more; 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons; missile-ready smallpox, and tens of thousands of scientists who know how to make weapons and missiles, but don’t know how to feed their families. Russia’s dysfunctional economy and eroded security systems have undercut controls on these weapons, material and know-how – and increased the risk that they could flow to terrorist groups or hostile forces.

Fortunately, we are not starting from scratch. Over the past ten years we have worked with Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus to recover and destroy hundreds of ballistic missiles, missile launchers, bombers, cruise missiles and strategic missile submarines. More than 5,500 warheads on strategic systems have now been deactivated. We have helped the Russians convert nuclear weapons facilities to civilian purposes and helped them employ hundreds of their weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits. The US and Russia cooperated in preventing the birth of three new nuclear powers.

These are important steps. But we need giant strides. Nuclear security is as good as its weakest link, and loose material in any country is a potential threat to the entire world. Until now, these investments have been almost exclusively American. Our European partners should join us in fighting proliferation and helping to get nuclear, chemical and biological materials under safe and secure control. We must increase our resources and shorten the timetable to reduce these risks. They are our most urgent unmet national security threat. One good idea are so-called debt-for-

security swaps. Under this concept, we would forgive Soviet-era debt in exchange for Russia putting rubles into nonproliferation programs. We must also convince all nuclear weapons states to secure weapons and weapons material within their borders. We must expand arms control agreements to include non-strategic forces, stockpiled weapons and nuclear, biological and chemical materials, and their infrastructure. We should expand these to efforts to eliminate plutonium and destroy chemical weapons.

The second piece of this puzzle is deterrence. Russia, the United States, and others retain powerful and credible deterrent forces that should make a direct nuclear attack or nuclear extortion by a nation very unlikely. But this deterrent effect can be achieved with far fewer forces. We should welcome U.S. and Russian intentions to each slash their long range nuclear weapons by two-thirds. But unilateral cuts alone, while laudable, may not necessarily produce a more crisis-resistant situation. Russia's early warning system is seriously eroded, and their command and control is not reliable. We must devise operational changes in these nuclear forces to reduce to zero the risk of accidental launch or miscalculation. Binding agreements also have value—they help ensure predictability, greater transparency, and effective verification.

Prevention and deterrence are inadequate. That is why a third piece is needed -- real defenses. Now, this issue has been debated here and in America more as a matter of theology or technology than strategy. Our goal cannot be to deploy a particular defense, but to reduce an overall threat. And given the other elements I have mentioned, we must now consider whether certain kinds of defensive systems can help do that as part of an overall security framework, not the whole of it.

By the end of this decade most of Europe will be within range of ballistic missiles from Greater Southwest Asia. And cruise missile technology is even more easily accessible. A major effort to explore appropriate theater missile defenses, including cruise missile defenses architectures is warranted – and permitted under the ABM Treaty.

But a shift to a deterrent strategy based on a mix of offensive and defensive capabilities cannot and should not be accomplished overnight. It should be done together with partners, at a pace commensurate with the technical maturity of defensive systems, and without losing the transparency, verifiability and stability that are the benefits of traditional arms control. It should be possible to reach an understanding with Russia that allows for the deployment of defensive technologies and finds successor arrangements to the ABM Treaty.

In short, to the extent that we can develop the means to shield ourselves from attack through a limited missile defense, we should do so – so long as it does not leave us more vulnerable to threats that are more likely, more immediate, and more potentially devastating. Our first line of defense is threat reduction, diplomacy, cooperation, military power and intelligence. Missile defense is our last line of defense. We have to guard against overinvesting in our last line of defense and underinvesting in all others. A new balanced, multi-faceted agenda for countering the various threats to the US, its allies and its Russian partner – including but not limited to defense against long-range missiles – makes more sense than an overly ambitious missile defense system alone.

Finally, defense must also mean societal protection. In the United States we call such an integrated program “homeland defense.” Since a direct German translation of “Heimatverteidigung” awakens troubled memories, let me leave it as “Landesverteidigung.” But what I mean is a fully integrated effort at domestic readiness that puts as much emphasis on public health and hospital preparedness as on disaster scene rescue capabilities. Such an effort is necessary regardless of whether terrorists ever brew nerve agents or master the microbe, since industrial chemicals are pervasive in modern society and pathogens can jump from continents overnight and resurface in more virulent or drug-resistant forms. More people died in the Bhopal chemical plant disaster in 1984 than in the World Trade Center attack. As former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn has stated, “We have to realize that we have reached a new realm in the

dialectic of new weapons and new defenses. In the evolution of warfare, arrows were countered by shields, swords with armor, guns with tanks, and now biological weapons must be countered with medicines, vaccines and surveillance systems.”

The US response is likely to be a grand national project on the order of the Apollo project that sent a man to the moon. We are already creating a stockpile of 300 million smallpox vaccines. What is the German response? Are authorities in Germany and Europe prepared to cope with a cyberattack on air traffic control system in Frankfurt as scores of commercial aircraft are trying to land safely in morning rain and fog? How about an airplane taking off from Paris and crashing into the Deutsche Bank tower in Frankfurt? In Europe there is a need for integrated response plans that can rush capabilities from one country to another, and deal with any kind of outbreak of human and agricultural disease. Transatlantic efforts to stockpile vaccines and antibiotics, develop common travel and quarantine procedures, common public health approaches, common standards for the protection of critical infrastructure could prove critical in preventing, containing and treating an emergency.

One initiative could be an ambitious research agenda, drawing on our best scientific talent and forward-thinking representatives of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, to address ways to reduce vulnerabilities to dangerous pathogens. With Russia we should combine our biodefense knowledge and devote our considerable resources to defensive and peaceful biological purposes.

This review shows how far our world has come since the fall of the Berlin Wall. And yet pundits still chart the health of our relationship by the degree of U.S. engagement in Europe rather than the degree of transatlantic partnership in the world. It's time for a new chart. If we are to preserve the essence of our partnership, then we must change the manner of its expression.

Are we ready for such a partnership? Will Americans have either the patience or the inclination to assemble the types of coalitions suggested here? Will Europeans have either the capacity or the will to generate the coherence of action that will be required? And are Germans, more than a decade after unification, prepared for the third great reorientation of their foreign policy since 1945, from Adenauer and Westbindung through Brandt and Ostpolitik to Schroeder and Fischer and the Berlin Republic's global responsibilities?

These are open questions. They will test leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. “The secret of governing well,” Victor Hugo once said, “is introducing just the right amount of the future into the present.” A global Atlantic Community is ambitious. It will not be quick, cheap or easy. It may never be achieved completely. But the journey can be as important as the destination.

Starting down that road will require Americans to work with others wherever they can, and only alone when they must. Until September 11 the Bush Administration and many in Congress were pursuing the opposite approach. Since September 11 they have been quite adept at multilateralism, but so far this has reflected more of an instrumental effort than a principled conversion. Did September 11 herald a paradigm shift in American foreign policy? It is too early to tell, but we would do well to heed the century-old words of Woodrow Wilson: “America is sauntering through her resources, and through the mazes of her politics with an easy nonchalance,” he said, “but presently there will come a time...when she will be obliged to pull herself together, husband her resources, concentrate her strength, steady her methods, sober her views, restrict her vagaries, trust her best, not her average, members. That will be the time of change.”

Few great goals in this world can be achieved without America. But America can achieve few of them alone. In this era of shadowy networks and nuclear terrorists, failed states and recession, banding together with others will often be the only way we can share our burdens, extend our influence, and achieve our goals.

Here in Europe, the debate about the future contours of the European Union, what our French friends call the finalite of Europe, is accelerating. The debate is fascinating, not only for what it has included but what it has largely excluded, notably the relationship of a bigger and better Europe to its transatlantic partners and a conception of its own role in the world. An outside observer is struck by the extent to which the debate is focused on what Europe should be, rather than what Europe should do.

Let me be very clear on this point. Europe's agenda of deeper integration is ambitious and daunting. It is important that it succeed. Enlargement is also essential. I am not trying to stick my American nose inside Europe's tent. But Americans -- and many others -- have an interest in the outcome, and we would hope that one result is a more effective partnership between the U.S. and a European Union that can act on a wider canvas. At its best, Europe has been defined not by its borders but by its horizons. And as the finalite debate proceeds, those horizons are fuzzy.

The only real reference to these wider dimensions of European unity was made by Joschka Fischer in Strasbourg, when he urged "to turn it from a western European Union into a Union for the whole of Europe capable of global action." But what kind of action? Is the emerging Europe likely to act more like the United States? Or more -- with apologies -- like a very big Switzerland? Will it act more like a superpower or a supermarket?

Many Europeans will argue that the challenge of a global partnership is too much too soon for a Europe overwhelmed by its agenda at home. Others will argue that the best way to enhance European cohesiveness and influence is not through closer Atlantic partnership but through greater European independence.

Both of these arguments only feed the very American unilateralism about which Europeans profess such concern. The real imbalance in the transatlantic partnership is not that there is too much America, it is that there is too little Europe. And if the true impulse for further unity only comes when Europeans define themselves in terms of what they are not -- that is, not Americans -- than what they are, then that is a declaration of bankruptcy of the European ideal.

The most serious repercussions of such developments would unfold in this country, for after enlargement the Berlin Republic will be transformed from Europe's front line to its heartland, the crossroads and central power of a dynamic continent. Chancellor Schroeder has called for "a new conception of German foreign policy." Germany's friends are confident that this new conception will be built on the successes of the Bonn Republic. But they wonder at times whether their confidence in Germany is matched by German confidence in themselves.

Of course, it is understandable to argue that greater German roles in the past have only brought grief to Germany and to the world. But there is a difference between learning from one's history and hiding behind it. When Germany achieved unity in freedom, you succeeded not only for yourselves, but for people on every continent. For decades American soldiers served here as trustees of your unity. Today, German airmen are patrolling the skies of North America as stewards of our freedom.

Germany's ability to adapt its foreign and security policy will be an important pacesetter and barometer of Europe's political will and commitment to a more global Atlantic Community.

There will also be important implications for our central institutions. We are not starting from scratch, of course; much of our institutional machinery for global cooperation is runs smoothly. But some adaptation will be needed.

NATO must continue to grow, but size is not purpose. Alliance forces must be prepared not only to defend our broader borders but also to defend against threats to our security from beyond them, whether formally through NATO or informally based on coalitions of the willing. And we should use the first-time invocation of NATO's Article V commitment to align national "homeland

defense" strategies with Alliance doctrine and force planning in defense of our "NATO homeland."

The U.S.-EU relationship is already global in scope. But we must act more effectively and quickly together in fast-breaking crises; identify and manage our differences before they impair our ability to work together; and improve our ability to address emerging threats and to ensure that the benefits of globalization are more fully shared. And we should consider a strategic shift in the focus of the OSCE – the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- away from central and southern Europe to the Caucasus and Central Asia. The key challenges of that region – building security and confidence within societies -- is what the OSCE does best.

In the end, however, the real question is not that of institutions but of shared perspective and determination. We can be proud of our accomplishments. But one clear lesson of September 11 – the red thread that winds its way through all of our policies -- is that our real enemy is our own complacency. "Our liberty is endangered if we rest on our achievements," President Kennedy reminded us at the Paulskirche in 1963, "For time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past are certain to miss the future."

Change is also hard. It breeds anxiety. Media attention is almost always riveted on how governments cope with change. Little is said of the quiet revolution that each individual must master. A quiet revolution is taking place today, person by person, in my country. I believe that words written by the Austrian poet Ingeborg Bachmann some decades ago capture well the prevailing mood:

Der Krieg wird nicht mehr erklärt,
sondern fortgesetzt. Das unerhörte
ist alltäglich geworden. Der Held
bleibt den Kämpfen fern. Der Schwache
ist in die Feuerzone gerückt.
Die Uniform des Tages ist die Geduld,
die Auszeichnung der armseligen Stern
der Hoffnung über dem Herzen.

This is a time of tragedy but also of immense opportunity, where everything is up for discussion, and great change is possible. Are we prepared to shape the future as we did in the past? Before September 11 it was an interesting debating point. Today, the stakes couldn't be higher. Americans are unlikely to change their ways unless their European partners do as well. The danger is that each side points to the other to justify why it is not they but others who have to change. And as so often in the past, the nature of the German-American partnership could prove decisive. Thank you.