



Creating a National Homeland Security Plan

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It is time to create a National Homeland Security Plan (NHSP) on par with the National Response Plan (NRP). The National Strategy for Homeland Security; Homeland Security Act of 2002; and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, establish objectives for a national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur¹. The NRP was created to establish a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. By its very nature it tends to focus on coordinating the activities of the signatory Federal agencies during the response phase with less application to preventing the terrorist attack. This leaves a gap in National Security preparedness. This analysis paper addresses the intersection between homeland security and national security in the context of homeland defense and how a NHSP will help bridge that gap.

US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is in the final steps of getting version 2.0 of the Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept (DOD HD & CS JOC) approved by the Secretary of Defense. As part of Department of Defense (DOD) transformation, the family of Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) describes how the Joint Force is expected to operate in the future and guide the development of future Joint capabilities. The DOD HD & CS JOC proposes that creating an NHSP is one way to strengthen National Security by defining roles and responsibilities at all levels of the government to address all threats to the nation.

The Homeland is confronted by threats ranging from national security threats (for example, ballistic missile attack) to law enforcement threats (for example, bank robbery) (Figure 1). This is a conceptual spectrum with clear definitions of both ends and less clarity in the middle where the two blend together. In the middle is a “seam” of ambiguity where threats are neither clearly military wartime threats (requiring a military [DOD] response capability) nor clearly

¹ National Response Plan December 2004

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criminal type threats (requiring a non-military response capability from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), or other agency)². Within this overlap area are threats such as transnational terrorist groups that challenge the delineation of responsibility between DOD and DHS, DOJ, or other agencies because it is sometimes difficult to label them as either a national security threat or a law enforcement threat.




Figure 1: National Challenge

Defense of the Homeland involves a global, multi-domain battlespace. Within the context of a global battlespace (Figure 2) the joint operations area (JOA) is a multi-domain space with the Homeland at its core. The JOA expands and contracts in relation to the Joint Force Commander’s ability to acquire and engage the adversary. Since the strategy is to engage adversaries before they gain access to the Homeland, areas of the JOA are often either in the Forward Regions or in the Approaches, or both³. The joint area of interest is the multi-domain space beyond the boundary of the JOA that is the source of indirect influence on the Joint Force Commander’s mission.

² Department of Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept V2.0

³ Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005

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


Figure 2: DOD Strategic Concept: Active, Layered Defense

Reducing uncertainty requires use and integration of existing and developing policy and guidance to clarify and codify roles, responsibilities, and an interagency concept of operation between DOD and non-DOD partners. A recommended approach is that DOD actively engage non-DOD partners using existing and developing policy and guidance to help develop a NHSP similar in concept to the NRP, but addressing detect, deter, prevent, or if necessary defeat versus post-attack roles and responsibilities⁴. The DOD HD & CS JOC also recommends that development and implementation of a NHSP would help cover the seam of uncertainty through the integration and coordination of planning, exercising, training, and operations with interagency partners to achieve desired outcomes.

The global war on terrorism (GWOT) requires a greater degree of interagency involvement and coordination than does conventional warfare. A challenge to achieving a wartime footing for DOD in terms of the GWOT is that many of the key “wartime” activities involve coordination and planning with other federal departments and agencies. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the President directed development of the NRP to align federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. While preparations and plans for DOD to support civil authorities in the event of an attack are outlined in the NRP, there is no similar overarching national level plan that specifically coordinates the pre-attack actions of the US government.

⁴ DOD HD & CS JOC

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Development of a NHSP, that operationalizes the National Security Strategy (NSS) and helps define roles and responsibilities for DOD and non-DOD partners, would help clarify how operations will be conducted in the “seam” of overlapping responsibilities and capabilities. The NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS) allow DHS to coordinate authorities, tasks, and procedures for all federal departments and agencies for post attack response measures. A NHSP would enable a coordinated national effort to do the same for pre-attack national security measures to detect, deter, prevent, or if necessary defeat external threats and aggression⁵.

This concept from the DOD HD & CS JOC does not specify the details of a NHSP. It is likely that in some areas, such as ballistic missile defense, DOD will be the lead and operate more or less autonomously. In other areas, such as maritime defense of the US, DOD may lead in some geographic areas and functions, while coordinating closely with one or more non-DOD agencies (for example the US Coast Guard). In yet other areas, such as the GWOT where the National Counter Terrorism Center is responsible for developing an integrated national strategic-operational plan, DOD will contribute to an integrated national planning effort and may lead in some areas and support in other areas as that plan is implemented.

USNORTHCOM offers three different campaign frameworks⁶ as fundamental to the discussion of the NHSP. All three campaign frameworks are founded on the central idea and strategic objective of this concept – dealing with threats to the US as early and as far forward from the Homeland as possible, and in the event of successful attack or natural catastrophe, to support an integrated national response that occurs as quickly and effectively as possible. DOD plays a vital role in each campaign. The first campaign framework is the “Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS) Campaign Framework” with DOD missions performed in each of the three regions to produce an active, layered defense of the Homeland. The second campaign framework is the “Homeland Security (HS) Campaign Framework” wherein the DHS, DOJ, or other non-DOD agency is designated as the lead or primary agency in conducting HS missions across several critical mission areas. The third campaign framework is the “National Security Campaign Framework” which encompasses the roles, missions, and actions of federal, state and local authorities, and other Government agencies at all levels in addressing threats to the Homeland.

❖ **Homeland Defense and Civil Support Campaign Framework**

⁵ DOD HD & CS JOC

⁶ The figures associated with each of the three campaign frameworks are conceptual examples and are not all inclusive of DOD HD and CS actions and the overlap of those actions with non-DOD partners.

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


Figure 3: HD and CS Campaign Framework

The HD and CS Campaign Framework of an active, layered defense builds upon the National Defense Strategy strategic objectives and serves to conceptually depict how DOD will accomplish its HD and CS missions, and Emergency Preparedness planning activities across the threat spectrum in the Forward Regions, Approaches, and the Homeland.⁷ This framework (for illustrative purpose only in Figure 3) emphasizes the critical importance of preventing attacks on the Homeland and mitigating and / or managing the consequences of the effects should they occur. To meet this complex challenge, planning and execution of military operations need to be integrated and synchronized within a larger national security strategy construct and conducted in coordination with other government agencies, allies, and international partners in a broader “National Security Campaign”. Integration and synchronization of HD operations and HS activities within the context of the National effort assure maximum and optimum resources against any designated threat.

❖ Homeland Security Campaign Framework

The purpose of a HS campaign, as expressed in the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), is to mobilize and organize the Nation to secure the US Homeland from terrorist attacks. The NSHS establishes a foundation upon which to organize HS efforts and delineates the strategic objectives of HS; prevent terrorist attacks within the US, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism and minimize damage and recover from attacks that do occur.

The NSHS also aligns and focuses HS functions into six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counter-terrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic threats, and emergency preparedness and response. The first three mission areas focus primarily on preventing terrorist attacks; the next

⁷ DOD HD & CS JOC

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two on reducing the Nation’s vulnerabilities; and the final one on minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. In this way, the NSHS provides a conceptual HS campaign framework to align the resources directly to the task of securing the Homeland.

Figure 4 displays, in general terms, a HS Campaign Framework based on the strategic objectives and the critical mission areas defined in the NSHS and imposed upon a generic threat campaign⁸. The critical mission areas are conceptually aligned with the major threat events (threat capability development through post - attack effects). This campaign




Figure 4: HS Campaign Framework

framework applies when DHS, DOJ, or another non-DOD agency is the designated lead or primary agency. While not the lead in this campaign, DOD must maintain cognizance of the situation and leverage critical situational intelligence / warning.

❖ National Security Campaign Framework

Threats such as transnational terrorist groups challenge the delineation of responsibility between DOD and DHS, DOJ, or other agencies because it is difficult to label them as either a national security threat or a law enforcement threat. Determining whether a particular threat is one or the other will depend on circumstances such as current law, authority to act, magnitude of the threat, response capabilities required, and asset availability. A coordinated, integrated, and coherent national effort will be essential to secure the Homeland against all threats. The absence of a clearly defined border between the overlap of DOD and DHS, DOJ, or other agency capabilities and responsibilities allows latitude in determining which threats are best

⁸ DOD HD & CS JOC

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met by law enforcement and which will require military response, and conceptually substantiates the importance of a National Security Campaign Framework⁹.




Figure 5: National Security Campaign Framework

Figure 5 illustrates how both DOD and non-DOD campaigns would work together to establish unified action against common threats and hazards in the Forward Regions, the Approaches, and the Homeland.

Having been part of discussing the need for a National Homeland Security Plan and later coordinating on its development within the DOD HD & CS JOC, the concept is sound and the product is feasible. For DOD conducting HD and CS operations, the strategic and operational context of integrated planning and conducting missions inside a broader National Security Campaign in coordination with non-DOD and international partners has significant implications. The first is the acknowledgement of other actors conducting parallel efforts to protect the US and the challenges and opportunities this national security partnership presents. The main challenge is coordinating and integrating, through formal and informal agreements, the activities of multiple federal, state, and local actors involved and operating in the same battlespace. Because the structure of the government makes unity of command impractical with this coalition of actors, coordination must be accomplished at all levels through formal and informal agreements. However, this spectrum of actors and capabilities also presents the opportunity for DOD and the Joint Force Commander to leverage cooperation to increase situational awareness, mitigate capability gaps in the Joint Force, and synchronize a more effective response to emerging threats. Interoperability and interagency coordination are key considerations in maximizing these opportunities.

⁹ DOD HD & CS JOC

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It is also important that it not be primarily a DOD plan. That could be problematic with the other federal agencies. It will succeed as a coordinated national effort to harness the 32 signatory agencies into one unified national effort to shape the security environment with unity of effort providing unity of results. It must be a global approach for integrating US capabilities to promote the active layered defense, defeating threats as far from our shores as possible. The NHSP will need to clearly identify and define roles and responsibilities to avoid overlap and identify gaps in strategy, policy and capabilities. As contained within the USNORTHCOM concept it will be a plan for detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating external threats and aggression. National security requires national actions and agencies that traditionally played only a domestic role increasingly have a role to play in our foreign and security policies. This requires us to better integrate interagency activity both at home and abroad. Finally the National Homeland Security Plan must be an overarching plan to coordinate all elements of national power, addressing challenges with the appropriate tools, to ensure the best mix of Diplomatic, Information, Military, and. Economic power.¹⁰

The USNORTHCOM recommendation, as articulated by Admiral Timothy J. Keating in his December 6, 2006 memo to the Deputy Secretary of Defense continued to advocate that the "best way forward is through an NHSP Working Group jointly established by the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council. This Working Group would be chartered to develop a draft National/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (NSPD/HSPD) that assigns roles for creating an NHSP."¹¹ The importance of this interagency group is to establish the interagency buy-in and build a sense of urgency. As conceptualized by USNORTHCOM, an NHSP would facilitate interagency coordination and collaboration by defining roles and responsibilities for detecting, deterring, preventing and defeating threats and aggression to carry out the NSS as an integrated national effort between DOD and non-DOD partners in homeland defense.

¹⁰ USNORTHCOM Point Paper on the National Homeland Security Plan (NHSP) Initiative V2.6

¹¹ Admiral Timothy J. Keating memo to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, December 6, 2006

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Mr. Barry Cardwell, Deputy Division Chief, Strategy and Policy Division, USNORTHCOM, provided significant background material and technical information on the DOD HD & CS JOC and the National Homeland Security Plan concept. His insight and recommendations are appreciated.

Mr. Richard Burmood, Senior Doctrine and Policy Analyst (L3 Communications), JTF-CS Plans and Policy Directorate, is the primary writer and lead contributor of this paper.

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