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Criminal And Terrorist Networks: Gauging Interaction And The Resultant Impact On Counter-Terrorism

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The connection between crime and terrorism is identified and measured along two lines of interaction: the first is focused on *crime* and *terrorism* as concepts defined within specific definitional parameters; whereas the second concentrates on crime and terrorism as distinctly identifiable non-state actors which challenge security on all levels of analysis through their actions. Although these two lines of interaction can be separated to ease enquiry and provide explanatory clarity, the relationship between crime and terrorism exists along a dynamic continuum which plots the organisational and operational interaction between both phenomena. Thus crime and terrorism as concept and entities cross-over on several analytical planes: first, through the creation of alliances between distinct entities; second, through the operational use of terror tactics by a criminal group or criminal tactics by a terrorist group; and third, through the convergence of criminal and terrorist tactics within a single group, thus creating a hybrid entity. The notion that crime and terrorism exist along a continuum is used to illustrate the fact that, in addition to situations of cooperation between a criminal and terrorist group, a single group can slide across a definitional scale between what is traditionally referred to as *organised crime* and *terrorism* depending on the environment in which it operates.¹

Although understanding the dynamic nature between *crime* and *terrorism* within the context of the crime-terror continuum provides insight into the overlap of these two concepts, it is the actual interaction between *crime* and *terrorism* as distinct entities which will frame the discussion of this paper. Since 9/11 it has become widely accepted that terrorist groups engage in criminal activities as an operational tactic used to both secure financing and to manipulate established criminal processes to access materials and know-how. As such, arguing that terrorists engage in criminal activity is a pedantic exercise. The notion, however, that criminal and terrorist groups collaborate is

¹ The notion of a convergence between organised crime and terrorism was first published by Tamara Makarenko in July 2000, see: "Crime and Terrorism in Central Asia," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 12:7. The crime-terror continuum as an aid to understanding the interaction between organised crime and terrorism was subsequently developed in greater detail in the following: "Transnational Crime and its Evolving Links to Terrorism and Instability," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 13:11 (November 2001); "A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relationships," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 15:8 (August 2003); "Transnational Crime and Terrorism: the emerging nexus", *Transnational Violence and Seams of Lawlessness in the Asia-Pacific*, Paul Smith, ed. (M.E. Sharpe, 2004); and, "Terrorism and Organised Crime," *Global Crime: the changing face of the modern underworld*, Mark Galeotti, ed. (Frank Cass Publishers, 2004).

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an observation that requires greater attention; especially given common reticence within the academic community to consider arguments which go contrary to the widely accepted view that criminal and terrorist groups have no interest in cooperating because any interaction is faced with inherent risks associated with trust, loyalty, divergent views on the necessity of the state, and transaction costs which naturally increases vulnerability of both sides to the authorities. It can thus be argued that dissecting the interaction between criminal and terrorist groups carries the potential of providing further insight into the actual crime-terror continuum, while also highlighting deficiencies in the current strategic focus of counter-terrorism.

Identifying Points of Interaction

The nature of a relationship between a criminal and terrorist group varies in terms of longevity and depth. They range between the ad hoc (i.e. one point in time) to longer-term strategic alliances; and, are formed for a variety of reasons such as seeking expert knowledge (i.e. money-laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making) and/or operational support (i.e. access to smuggling routes and safe havens). In theory cooperation potentially provides significant benefits for both parties involved, including everything from access to previously unobtainable know-how and materials, to the destabilisation of political structures (i.e. through corruption and violence) and international counter-terrorism or anti-crime policies through the undermining of trust between state actors. Regardless of the country which hosts a crime-terror connection, mapping the associated dynamics and resultant implications of such interaction often reveals a network that extends from an international to community context. Thus in a policy context, the existence of any crime-terror connection merely highlights the fact that law enforcement, homeland security and national security are intrinsically linked together.

In assessing the interaction between criminal and terrorist groups, the available evidence indicates that the depth of collaboration is most often dependant on the nature of the geographic region in which these relations are established. As illustrated in Figure 1, relations in Western democracies are often based on sympathetic feelings which can emerge from loyalties to specific ethnic or religious community, or it can be established through converts. Relations in transitional states are most accurately described as ad hoc because they are predominantly based on fulfilling immediate operational needs; and, relations which emerge within (post)conflict societies tend to be the ones that are most developed and interactive. In conflict-ridden and conflict-prone environments, the maintenance of instability is in the interest of terrorists because it diminishes the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of the mass populations – the very people terrorists seek to gain support from; and it is in the interest of criminal groups who have learned how to maximise profits within this context. For this reason, the relationship between criminal and terrorist networks are most developed and prevalent in South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Eurasia; however, they are potentially most dangerous in North America and Western Europe precisely because these ties are less transparent and more adaptive.

[Insert: Figure 1]

Interaction in Unstable Environments

Criminal and terrorist networks which have emerged from a state of perpetual conflict and instability blatantly reveal the ultimate danger of the crime-terror connection to international security. Operating within de facto 'safe havens' for illicit operations, weak and failed states foster

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nefarious collaboration, which subsequently seeks to perpetuate a condition of civil (or regional) war to secure economic and political power. At an extreme end, this is reflected in the conditions of Afghanistan, Angola, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Tajikistan, and confined territories in Pakistan, Indonesia and Thailand where government control is extremely weak, if existent at all. Although unstable, but not necessarily classified as failed states, conditions in many South American and African states also fall within this category when assessments of relations between criminal and terrorist networks are concerned. In most of these situations conflict/war has provided “legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources.”²

Conflict that besets the interaction between criminal and terrorist networks share several common characteristics. To begin with, these conflicts usually have no clear military objective and lack political order. Instead, military units constitute “little more than marauding bands acting quite independently” and “showing no discipline whatsoever in the actions they were committing.”³ Furthermore, it is evident that the perpetuation of conflict, as opposed to victory, becomes a priority in order to create ideal conditions for criminal activities to flourish⁴ **amongst groups equally motivated** by the “accumulation of wealth, control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy. Together, these elements represent usable power – power to allocate values and resources in society.”⁵ **Unlike traditional organised crime, epitomised by the established hierarchical groups such as the Japanese Yakuza, which is dependent on the international financial system and state stability, criminal networks which grew from within unstable environments have no innate loyalty to the state. As a result, the risk calculations which are made prior to engaging with known terrorist networks are extremely open, based more on fulfilling immediate benefits rather than assessing long-term repercussions.**

Alliances between criminal and terrorist groups in environments characterised by perpetual instability emerged as early as the 1980s in very specific cases that saw both groups benefit from such a relationship. The first such documented alliances were created in Latin America between terrorist groups such as Colombia’s FARC and the Shining Path of Peru, and the infamous drug cartels (i.e. Cali and Medellin). In exchange for securing drug laboratories and airstrips, the terrorist groups collected a local tax from the drug trade. Relations between criminal and terrorist groups in South America evolved over the years, from the Medellin cocaine cartel allegedly hiring the ELN to plant car bombs in 1993⁶, to FARC increasingly taking control over cocaine trafficking operations after the demise of the Cali and Medellin cartels and using cocaine as currency for arms shipments supplied by criminal groups in Mexico⁷ and Russia⁸. Although South America is no longer

² Mary Kaldor, *Old and New Wars: organised violence in a global era* (Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 110.

³ Snow (1999), pp. 109-111.

⁴ Berdal and Serrano, eds. (1999), p. 199.

⁵ Manwaring (1993), pp. 7-8.

⁶ Patrick Clawson and Rensselaer Lee, *The Andean Cocaine Industry*, St. Martin’s Press, 1996, p. 53.

⁷ “Colombian Rebel Connections to Mexican Drug Cartel,” Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman for the U.S. Department of State, (29 November 2000), <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/11/irp-001129-col.htm>; Luis Gutierrez Esparza, “La Mafia Rusa en Mexico,” *Memorando*, (29 July 2001), <http://latamcent.org.mx>; and, *Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002*, A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress (February 2003); Sam Logan, “Organised crime, Mexico's top threat,” *ISN Security Watch* (26 April 2006).

⁸ Jerry Seper, “Mexicans, Russian Mob New Partners in Crime,” *The Washington Times*, (20 August 2001); “Peru: a

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characterised as an unstable environment; pockets of sustained instability, especially in the case of Colombia, set a worthwhile historical precedent against which contemporary examples could be compared.

South America, however, is not a unique case study; on the contrary, other regions provide equally illustrative examples of how crime and terror naturally relate in environments characterised by sustained conflict or perpetual political instability. For example, a similar situation existed in South and Southeast Asia during the 1980s when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) established ties with the Indian mafia⁹ to sell illicit narcotics in exchange for arms. Such relations have existed with criminal groups based in Pakistan and Burma; and groups based throughout South/Central Asia who have provided the LTTE access weapons, training, established smuggling routes and corrupt relations which were used to facilitate the movement of human cargo and narcotics. Other Indian and Pakistani-based criminal groups have also been implicated in 'exchange' relationships with Al Qaeda and Lashkar e-Tayyaba. Similar relations with regional criminal networks also exist amongst the myriad of groups operating in Thailand¹⁰, and the Indonesian conflict zones of Aceh, Sulawesi and Maluku¹¹ – with the specific intent of arming terrorist groups.

The most debilitating case for international counter-terrorism initiatives, including those led by the U.S., relates to the persistence of ties between criminal and terrorist networks in Afghanistan. The persistence and evolution of crime-terror collaboration in the face of Coalition forces engaged in counter-terrorism and reconstruction efforts has contributed to sustained instability and an inability of the Coalition forces to make inroads in winning the hearts and minds of the local populations. This has been further exacerbated by the confusion with which the various military missions have been characterised and the Taliban's shifting frontline (i.e. marked by territorial gains and propaganda successes). In this rather complex environment, criminal and terrorist networks have managed not only to maintain their hold over the highly profitable narcotics trade, but they have also evolved the trafficking process into networks which have become increasingly organised and sophisticated in nature. Furthermore, these networks have been facilitated and secured as a result of the importance the drug mafias placed on creating a highly corrupt and conducive government apparatus. Conservative estimates by the U.N. indicate that at least a quarter of the Afghan parliament is involved in the drugs trade, a figure which does not take into consideration the collusion of provincial governors and law enforcement.

Regardless of the Coalitions' focus on eliminating the Taliban and all Al Qaeda remnants in Afghanistan, the existence of a crime-terror nexus inherently undermines any such efforts – least of which because it is politically difficult to explain why it is that senior Afghan government officials are engaged in the very trade which is funding the resurgence of the Taliban and other region groups including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.

spy story replete with arms, drugs-dealers and bears," CNN, (08 September 2000); and, "Farlandia," a discussion of narco-states cited in the transnational crime section of the Centre for the Study of International Security website (Washington, D.C.): <http://www.csis.org>.

⁹ This alliance is discussed in Kshitij Prabha, "Narco-Terrorism and India's Security," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, no. 10 (January 2001).

¹⁰ For comprehensive assessments of these relations, see the work of Anthony Davies published in *Jane's Intelligence Review* between 2002 and 2007.

¹¹ These allegations were first uncovered by Anthony Davis, "The Complexities of Unrest in Southern Thailand," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 14, 9 (September 2002).

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Furthermore, the same product which continues to finance regional terrorism can arguably still be connected to a centralised recruitment and training base for militants in the Pakistani Tribal areas who have interests in bringing their knowledge to support operations in Western Europe and the U.S. Although the flow of narcotics trafficked from Afghanistan to Pakistan has dissipated in favour of the Northern and Balkan trafficking routes, the fact that three of six key transshipment hubs for Afghan opium and heroin are located in Pakistan (Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi) is significant. The other three are located in Kyrgyzstan (around Osh), and in Iran (around Zahedan and Mashhad)¹² - ultimately using West African, Caucasian, Central Asia, Turkish, Kurdish and Albanian criminal networks to bring narcotics shipments to destinations throughout Eurasia and Europe.

Without considering the complexities which the growing interaction between criminal and terrorist networks in Africa pose to current counter-terrorism initiatives, the South American and South Asian cases are indicative of the blurring lines between homeland and national security. In both cases, attempts made by the U.S. to increase its national security have produced increased threats from terrorism against the U.S. and U.S. interests. In spite of efforts to support Colombia in eradicating coca and eliminating insurgent groups, the interaction between crime and terrorism around the cocaine trade has produced 'back doors' through which foreign-based terrorists could feasibly manipulate to either penetrate the U.S. with operatives, or support cells already entrenched within American society. This is replicated in Afghanistan, where despite U.S. efforts to eliminate terrorist bases, the networks used to traffic opiates to the West are the same networks which could be manipulated by terrorists seeking retribution by targeting U.S. interests in the region and by feeding global anti-American sentiment through propaganda drives which are, in part, supported through drug profits.

Interaction in Transitional States

Transitional states, generally incorporating the former Soviet Union, parts of Eastern Europe, the Americas and the Middle East, provide a different context in which criminal and terrorist networks engage with one another. Unlike criminal and terrorist groups engaged in conflict and post-conflict societies the nexus in transitional states is not necessarily about perpetuating instability, but about maximising the chances of success for immediate operations. In this environment, illicit actors – regardless if they are characterised as criminals, terrorists or insurgents – have a driving interest in profit maximisation as the route to ensure their survival. This is a motivation which is facilitated by poor border security, weak law enforcement, corrupt public officials, and established smuggling networks. As such, transitional states are most often used to provide exchanges of goods, access to established smuggling routes and/or expertise. Interaction thus predominantly follows the trade in high value illicit commodities, such as narcotics and arms.

The former Soviet Union, for example, provided black market access to an arsenal of weaponry (including chemical, biological and radiological materials). In the 1990's their were fears cited by Western governments and academics that these materials could be directed to terrorist groups. Although fears regarding the trade in chemical, biological and radiological materials have been sustained through the years, it is the trade in Soviet-sourced arms on the black market that has proven to be difficult to disrupt. Controlled, in most contexts, by major international arms dealers,

¹² Based on confidential discussions with U.N. personnel.

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terrorists have yet to become a notable direct client of the black arms market. Although an ideological argument could be formed to explain why arms dealers tend not to directly source terrorist groups, the reality is that international arms dealers are not interested in terrorist groups because they generally purchase in small quantities. As a result, terrorist networks interested in acquiring weapons or related materials are reliant, at least in many transitional states, on criminal networks or individual intermediaries who have established relations to the market gatekeepers. This appears to have been the case in 2005 when Italian authorities uncovered an extensive arms trafficking network that supplied known Islamist militants. The ring supplied weapons through a network established between Bosnian criminals and the Camorra, the later of which simultaneously sought to help the militants enter Europe clandestinely and provide them with arms and explosives.

One of the regions most vulnerable to smuggling of radiological material, more specifically, is the Caucasus where criminal networks have evolved to incorporate relations between state officials, business interests, and terrorist groups. In fact, during investigations into criminal groups operating in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2005, Georgian authorities uncovered several smuggling networks which were found to support the transit of numerous goods, including radiological materials. With the support of the U.S., a sting operations was orchestrated in February 2006 in which 'buyers' were sent to the breakaway regions. Although no known terrorist interests were implicated in this operation, the fact that orphan and unsecured radiological materials could be accessed confirms the position cited by the FBI in 2005 after they broke up a criminal network planning shipments of various weapons – including a claim of enriched uranium - from Armenia, Chechnya, Georgia or Ukraine to the U.S. At the time an FBI representative posited that “these individuals may not have been terrorists themselves, but they have showed transparent willingness to do anything with anybody, so long as it generates money for their organisation.”¹³

The interest of criminal networks in transitional states to maximise profits has also been mirrored in South America; with South American authorities repeatedly expressing concerns regarding the willingness of criminal groups to provide services for foreign-based terrorist groups. For example, since 2005 reports have noted that Mexican and Peruvian groups – with no identifiable state or social allegiance – have attempted to specialize in establishing smuggling rings that trafficked Middle Easterners into the U.S. Concerns emerged when individuals with alleged ties to militant Islamist groups sought to become involved in these structures.¹⁴ Human smuggling rings with the ability to facilitate the entry of militants into the U.S. was further highlighted with the discovery of a Colombian false-passport ring which involved Colombian nationals and foreign nationals with ties to Jordan and the Palestinian territories.¹⁵ Although it is most likely that the false passports supplied by this criminal network went predominantly to Colombian-based groups such as FARC, the concern does highlight an inherent vulnerability for the U.S. which continues to emanate from its' southern neighbours – a vulnerability not only to the various perils of the cocaine trade itself, but from the willingness of groups controlling narcotics smuggling routes to use that control for the benefit (knowingly or unknowingly) of terrorist financing or operations.

Despite the experiences of the regions noted in this section, and support provided by the U.S.

¹³ Discussions with Aleksandr Kupatadze, April 2007.

¹⁴ These concerns were presented in a succinct analysis provided by the Jamestown Terrorism Monitor 3:22 (17 November 2005).

¹⁵ “U.S. seeks 8 tied to passport ring,” Associated Press (27 January 2006).

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government to help strengthen anti-crime and counter-terrorism initiatives, the connections between crime and terror persist. Unfortunately these connections are, in many states, enhanced by the inability to curtail corruption or assert government legitimacy and authority throughout the state. Long histories of political instability, mistrust in bureaucracy and state institutions, have created environments in which people are generally driven by concerns over securing the present, as opposed to concerns regarding the implications of their actions for the future. The cycle which results thus makes stability elusive, and in fact feeds into instability both internally and regionally.

Thus in the case of Colombia, for example, despite all the money channelled through Plan Colombia, the country remains a faltering state that sporadically feeds into regional instability through the relations established between FARC and the Colombian paramilitaries (i.e. AUC) and regional criminal groups to move narcotics to the U.S. and European markets. The continued existence of a narcotics economy and culture within South America will indefinitely undermine the creation of a functioning political system which is not itself implicated in corruption associated with securing, and thus perpetuating, the crime-terror nexus. And in each example cited above, the flawed nature of national security programmes implemented by the U.S. are highlighted in the inherent threats posed to U.S. homeland security through the existence of smuggling networks which, for the right price, can be readily manipulated by terrorist interests.

Interaction in Western Democracies

Connections between criminal and terrorist groups are most readily identifiable in environments characterised by some degree of instability – be it in a state of outright conflict, or suffering from entrenched corruption which fuels the rise of criminal enterprise. In these environments not only is the existence of criminal and terrorist networks expected, but their interaction seems natural – even if only ad hoc in nature. Identifying the connection between criminal and terrorist networks in Western democracies, however, is significantly more complex. To begin with, these societies pose a host of obstacles to illicit operations, making internal group trust and loyalty more sensitive issues. Furthermore, there is a natural ideological divide between criminal and terrorist networks; highlighted by the fact that criminal groups successfully operating in the West have no interest in destroying the fabric of the society from which they prosper. As such, of all types of societies, the crime-terror nexus seems most unwelcome, and thus most unlikely, in Western democracies.

The notion of a connection between criminal and terrorist networks emerging in Western democracies, however, should not be entirely discarded. On the contrary, in addition to monitoring potential avenues of terrorist financing, there is a need to simultaneously monitor points where a potential relationship between crime and terror would be feasible. This is not entirely a scenario-building exercise, but is in fact based on evidence and concerns emanating from completed and ongoing counter-terrorism investigations. For example, in 2002 Italian authorities noted that criminal and terrorist cells were engaged in a reciprocal relationship wherein Italian criminal groups smuggled arms to Palestinian and North African groups in exchange for supporting Italian narcotics smuggling networks. That same year allegations regarding cooperation between the 'Ndrangheta and militant cells based in Italy also emerged, and in 2004 Italian authorities noted concerns regarding Neopolitan mafia converts establishing an arms-for-drugs network on behalf of Italian based terrorist cells. The integration of these 'types' of individuals came to a head in 2004 when, following the Madrid attack (3/11), Spanish authorities discovered that drug traffickers were radicalised and integrated into the terrorist cell responsible – thus adding contacts and skill-sets

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required for successful preparation. A year later, French authorities dismantled an 'illicit network' in 2005 which consisted of several individuals including known militants, radicalised delinquents and common criminals.

The driver behind the cases of crime-terror interaction noted above is not believed to be profit-maximisation or a desire to secure an unstable operating environment. These connections appear to be based on a more complex equation, combining factors such as loyalties to a specific ethnic or religious community, or the emergence of sympathetic feelings by the criminal/criminal network – feelings often reflected in converts. These trends appear to be consistent throughout North America and Western Europe, and are most relevant in the context of radicalisation and conversion of criminals within prison systems, as was the case with

John Jose Padilla, Walker Lindh and Richard Reid. In fact, France, the U.S. and the U.K. have all admitted that their prisons systems are vulnerable to charismatic radical Islamist leaders inspiring prisoners to join the *global jihad*. The problem of radicalisation in respect to the U.S. was succinctly established in a study by George Washington University¹⁶ which identified four main radicalization processes: individual, organised, gang and para-radicalisation. Potentially the most problematic in terms of the crime-terror nexus are gang radicalisation and para-radicalisation. In the former pre-existing prison gangs are exploited to attract converts (thus taking advantage of an established system of trust and loyalty), and para-radicalisation referring to a situation when non-radicalised individuals aid radicalised networks. Thus in addition to creating an inherent 'home-grown' terrorist threat, the interaction within prison systems also provides terrorist cells in Western democracies with access to the know-how required to conduct criminal activities which remain below the radar of law enforcement because they are naturally high volume and low cost (i.e. various types of fraud and petty crimes).

Policy Recommendations

Although caution must accompany any assessment focused on identifying points of interaction between very distinct groups, it would be naïve – in the face of solid examples – to conclude that it is not in the interest of criminal and terrorist groups to cooperate. By quoting traditional understandings of motivation and internal aversion to risk as justification for crime and terrorism not to cooperate, merely supports current counter-terrorism policies. After six years of implementation these policies have not significantly altered the terrorist risk environment. In fact, it is through the strategies implemented by Western democracies in their desire for national security that the risks to homeland security are ironically increasing. Although there are numerous examples where this is the case, the most illustrative is evident in debates regarding radicalisation of individuals not only throughout the world, but also throughout the Western world. As such, it may be argued that the policies our own governments adopt to enforce security and stability in the international system are having a boomerang effect which can no longer be ignored.

Counter-terrorism is naturally a complex phenomenon which naturally takes time to perfect in environments, and against adversaries, which are by nature flexible and adaptive. However, instead

¹⁶ George Washington University and the Critical Incident Analysis Group, [Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalisation](#) (2006).

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of seeking to entrench our approach to counter-terrorism, the only way to meet the threat as it is evolving, is to ensure that counter-terrorism is itself innately flexible and adaptive. Unfortunately this naturally goes against the way security and defence have been organised in the West. Recommendations therefore need to combine central coordination with the need for specialised agencies to take the lead in identifying, monitoring, and securing the vulnerabilities and gaps within their areas of responsibility. In relation to the interaction between crime and terrorism, this has several implications for counter-terrorism strategy. Using the '5-D' approach to counter-terrorism, the following are some key recommendations for integrating the threat of a crime-terror nexus into U.S. initiatives:

Deterrence: In theory, the notion of deterrence should be an effective tool which can be employed against states in which the threat from an interaction between crime and terrorism could be detrimental to the security of the U.S. Unfortunately, deterrence is most likely to work in a context in which the target has something to lose – as such, deterrence has historically been successfully employed between state actors, and thus has limited value to non-state actors in unstable and transitional environments, who do not necessarily guide their actions according to our understanding of how a rational state would. Although deterrence is employed on a state level in relation to counter-terrorism, it is ineffectual when pitted against governments which are unable to exert control throughout their territory. Deterrence as a counter-terrorism tool should thus be focused on the contexts in which it is most likely to contribute to an overall strategy: such as on a sub-national level within the U.S. In other words, deterrence could be integrated within a Criminal Justice strategy focused on discouraging prison radicalisation, or engaging in document or banking fraud.

Dissuasion: Dissuasion is a policy approach which has not been adequately integrated within counter-terrorism strategies despite its importance in relation to winning the hearts and minds of individuals who may be considered vulnerable to radicalisation. As a form of communication focused on influencing a target towards a certain action or inaction through logic or reason, dissuasion highlights the need – especially in relation to circumventing militant Islamist arguments – to enter into our a dialogue which does not present issues in black and white, but articulates the complexities and realities of the 'grey'. For example, dissuasion can be used to build a moral argument to the banking sector that it is essential for them to disclose all fraud-related losses to the authorities because fraud is not only a problem of criminality, but fraud provides a natural point of confluence between crime and terrorism. Thus banks could be more willing to share information with the authorities in the knowledge that they may be providing important intelligence. Dissuasion is therefore a strategic tool that can be implemented from a community to federal level, benefiting intelligence-led policing and intelligence-led diplomacy when foreign-based actors are involved.

Denial: In relation to the interaction between crime and terrorism, denial as a strategy presents a catch-22 situation. Although the importance of blocking criminal opportunities is important in both the context of anti-crime and counter-terrorism, the ability to identify crimes which are of interest to both criminal and terrorist networks provides an invaluable intelligence tool. Thus prior to implementing a policy of denial, it is essential to use knowledge of crime-terror interaction to collect more insight regarding organisational design of both groups, including the fundamentals of the acquisition and movement of criminal financing. Such knowledge not only contributes to the building of solid cases for prosecution services, but it also helps develop adaptive

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forecasting models which all law enforcement and the security services to focus their resources.

Diplomacy: As with deterrence, diplomacy is a tool which, in a traditional setting, works best when it involves defined state actors. However, diplomacy has been evolving to meet the challenges of the contemporary system, and has application to counter-terrorism when it is conceptualised as a tool that supports the responsible and accountable management of world politics and global interdependence. In the context of the crime-terror nexus, diplomacy is a tool that could be effectively used to (a) initiate and maintain dialogue between stakeholders who have an interest in reducing the opportunities for criminal and terrorist networks to collaborate, and (b) collect and distribute intelligence from/to stakeholders with an ability to contribute to the identification and disruption of criminal-terrorism ties. In other words, there is a need to be creative with diplomacy in a counter-terrorism context, moving away from a reliance on the state system to engage actors with the ability to alter the environment in which they operate (i.e. international business). This is especially true in unstable environments and states who do not exert authority or control throughout their territory.

Defense: Although defence is accepted as an integral component of counter-terrorism, it can not be treated as the *a priori* approach to national or homeland security when dealing with adversaries who are not easily identifiable. Furthermore, although in theory defence operations can secure an unstable situation, the strategy that guides operational and tactical decisions must be well defined and compliant to an overall counter-terrorist strategy that seeks to diminish the utility of terrorism by undermining its validity to the very people which terrorist groups seek support from. In relation to connections between criminal and terrorist networks, the most relevant implication of defence operations emanates from the fact that defence strategies merely displace or in some cases exacerbate conditions which create opportunities for criminal activity, and potential terrorist reliance and thus willingness to engage with the criminal realm.

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