

CHAPTER 4

All for one, one for all: towards a transatlantic solidarity pledge

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Introduction

The tenth anniversary of the attacks of 11 September 2001 gives pause for thought and an opportunity to reflect on the next steps for the transatlantic security relationship. The attacks on that fateful day did more than highlight the increasing complexities of terrorism. They also cast global interdependencies and a widening threat environment into sharp relief. The world's common arteries and infrastructures, which generate great prosperity in normal times, were used by a small group of agents to wreak havoc in one of the world's most powerful countries. This lesson was repeated in subsequent, less dramatic events – the insidious use of cyber attacks, the cascading effects of ash clouds, or the societal-wide impact of pandemic outbreaks – and justified the flurry of activities that were undertaken on both sides of the Atlantic to secure the US and EU 'homelands'.

Ten years later, the dense network of arteries supporting open societies on both sides of the Atlantic remains vulnerable to disruption. While the initial flurry of activity produced a number of low-profile arrangements, such efforts have not been guided towards what must be our ultimate goal: achieving transatlantic resilience in a common area of freedom, justice and security. That goal can be revived, but it must be undergirded by higher-profile attention and a strong sense of mutual commitment, framed by a Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge that generates political impetus and direction to practical initiatives that could restructure and reorient EU-US security relations for the next ten years.

Transatlantic relations in perspective

Few who remember the events of 11 September 2001 will forget Europe's immediate call for solidarity in response. The options of quiet support, silence or even *schadenfreude* were rejected in favour of solidarity,

demonstrating the depth of shared purpose between Europe and the US honed over decades – and a sense of common vulnerability exposed in the new millennium. For the first time in its history NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the alliance’s mutual defence clause. In their respective spheres, the EU and US complemented NATO action by focusing on bolstering internal security, including reforms in law, institutions and operations. The US approved new security provisions, headlined by the Patriot Act; amalgamated various domestic agencies into the Department of Homeland Security; and took a tougher stance on security across the board through intensive and extensive screening at US borders and airports, the US Container Security Initiative, and such international efforts as the Proliferation Security Initiative. The EU, both at national and supranational levels, undertook judicial reforms, boosted police cooperation, enhanced safety and security cooperation across the EU’s policy sectors, and improved intelligence cooperation. Each reached across the Atlantic to improve data sharing and operational cooperation, including two new treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, much of it done quietly and conscientiously by mid-level officials.

To be sure, the aftermath of 9/11 also led to fissures in the relationship. The launch of the Iraq war, which led first to fractures within Europe and then to transatlantic tension, confirmed that some US methods in pursuing terrorism diverged from European preferences. Nor did certain US practices in prosecuting alleged terrorists – including extraordinary rendition and the opening of the Guantanamo prison camp – receive a warm welcome among European societies with a strong preference for prioritising civil liberties. Policy debates at the EU level also provoked dissension, including the initial approach of the US towards the terrorist finance tracking programme (or ‘SWIFT’ agreement) and US moves away from the EU level in favour of bilateral agreements on passenger name record (PNR) sharing. But for the most part, these remained policy disputes rather than fundamental ruptures.

Indeed, in broader perspective and with the benefit of hindsight, the most lasting effect of 9/11 on the transatlantic relationship was to highlight, if not directly accentuate, pre-existing trends influencing security considerations for both sides of the Atlantic. One such trend was the increasing depth of critical interdependencies in the global system. A handful of transboundary arteries carrying people, ideas, money, energy, goods and services criss-cross modern societies and contribute significantly to economic growth and prosperity. They are essential sinews of the global economy and of daily communications. Yet they are also susceptible to disruption in several ways. The networks carrying these vital elements can be preyed upon directly by dangerous agents. Or these networks can be disrupted indirectly in unforeseen ways. As Charles Perrow argues, modern infrastructures (energy and communication, for

instance) inter-connect in intricate ways that are poorly understood even by the technicians operating those systems.¹ Complex interconnections represent vulnerabilities in the global system: intentional or accidental disruptions can bring down the ability of societies to function. Just as governments traditionally protect their territory, so too must they protect their connectedness – the networks that bind them and their citizens with the rest of the world.

The second trend is the increasing complexity and opacity of threat agents. The capability of a small, nebulous group of attackers, planning and mobilising attacks across state borders, was the calling card of September 11. But the same dynamics hold whether we speak of infrastructure breakdowns triggering transcontinental power outages, natural disasters shutting down air traffic, or a communicable disease undermining public order in multiple cities. In today's threat environment, problems 'out there' immediately affect populations 'in here'. Equally disconcerting, initial threats may be less lethal than their knock-on effects – demonstrating the mutual vulnerabilities free societies have engineered for themselves. The difficulties of predicting the onset of dangerous threats, and the fact that many threats originate and become manifest in either the US or EU, and then can be amplified through the dense weave of transatlantic arteries binding European and American societies, underscore the importance of working together to tackle complex threats.

A third trend was confirmed in the aftermath of September 11: shifts in relative power in the world order. The sense of vulnerability of the world's most powerful country exposed by the attacks was followed by a decade of US deployment of military power against a nebulous enemy – with varying degrees of success. While huge amounts of energy and resources were devoted to hunt for Osama bin Laden after September 11, 'the future was being written in Beijing, Delhi, Rio and beyond'.² Rising powers are clearly seeking influence commensurate with their growing presence in their respective regions and on the global stage. Whether they will challenge the prevailing order or accommodate themselves within it depends significantly on how Europe and the US engage, both with them but also with each other.

After all, the EU and US are at the centre of the dynamic, open Western networked order. The more united, integrated, and interconnected that order is, the more likely others will join and participate, rather than resist or stand apart. If a key strategy in a G-20 world is to protect and reinforce the institutional foundations of Western order, the EU-US relationship takes on a central importance. Being able to adopt common normative postures, when the normative identity of many rising powers is in flux, constitutes a comparative advantage in a world shaped by relative power.³ This insight applies directly to issues related

1. Charles Perrow, *Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984/1999).
2. Philip Stevens, 'No, 9/11 Did Not Change the World', *Financial Times*, 1 September 2011.
3. Giovanni Grevi and Richard Youngs, 'What Norms for a New-Order Transatlantic Relationship? European Perspectives,' in Daniel Hamilton and Kurt Volker (eds), *Transatlantic 2020: America and Europe in a Changing World* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2011); G. John Ikenberry, 'The Rise of China and the Future of the West,' *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2008; G. John Ikenberry, 'The Future of the Liberal World Order,' *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2011.

to upholding open, common areas of freedom, security and justice. The rules of the road for the regulation of cyberspace, for instance, will prove a contentious issue, one on which autocratic and democratic societies will stake out different positions. If the US and Europe can agree on basic international norms and standards, such measures will likely provide the basis for global arrangements. If the US and Europe fail to agree or diverge in their approaches, however, in a world of diffuse power no such global standards are likely to emerge – or both sides could be faced with standards and norms set by others.⁴

The problems and promise of cooperation

These trends demand a reoriented approach to EU-US security cooperation in an unpredictable and shifting threat environment. This relationship, we argue below, is best directed toward the pursuit of transatlantic resilience in a common area of freedom, justice and security. Unfortunately, there is a growing mismatch between the nature of our challenges and the institutional frameworks, strategic-action capacity, and practical tools at our disposal to achieve this goal.

Europe and the US do not lack for institutional frameworks: transatlantic cooperation takes place amidst a veritable alphabet soup of mechanisms and institutions. Many observers focus first on NATO, which remains an essential transatlantic security institution and is busier than ever managing complex operations in places like Afghanistan and Libya – not least since it reframed its role in global security in its 2010 Strategic Concept. But NATO is neither equipped, nor the appropriate vehicle, to take the lead on building transatlantic resilience. Many areas of law enforcement, domestic intelligence, civil security and disaster response are well beyond NATO's area of competence, and are better handled in other venues. NATO could – and should – complement such efforts, for instance by helping (as it has already done) with security for mass public events, dealing with the consequences of various natural disasters, or coping with a catastrophic terrorist event, particularly one involving agents of mass destruction. But in most of these areas NATO would be at most a supporting player, not the lead actor.

The EU-US relationship is increasingly the vehicle for pursuing common goals related to 'homeland' security. That relationship, especially when seen to encompass the relations the US maintains with the EU's 27 Member States as well as its Brussels-based institutions, is among the most complex and multi-layered economic, diplomatic, societal and security relationship that either partner has. Not only does cooperation run broad and deep – a critical consideration when designing resilience-enhancing initiatives across the policy spectrum – but the two sides

4. For more on this issue, see Jason Healey, 'Breakthrough or Just Broken? China and Russia's UNGA Proposal on Cyber Norms'; UK Foreign Minister William Hague, 'Security and freedom in the cyber age – seeking the rules of the road,' Munich Security Conference, 4 February 2011; 'Nations call on UN to discuss cyber security,' *China Daily*, 14 September 2011.

are also enmeshed in security interdependencies. Add to this the fact that the EU is increasingly the institution that European governments use to coordinate their own security policies and action, and it is hard to deny that the EU will be America's essential partner in many of the areas beyond NATO's purview and capacities.

Yet the US-EU relationship has never been properly framed in strategic terms. The US has no link to European partners in the EU that is equivalent to its link through NATO, even though most of those partners are members of both organisations. There is insufficient understanding in many (but not all) Washington circles about the rising role of the EU not only in justice and home affairs matters but in protecting citizens and critical infrastructures more broadly. The EU shoulders some of the blame: the nature of its bureaucratic structures, and the division of national-supranational competences, makes strategic dialogue difficult. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton touched upon this reality when she noted to her European colleagues, 'the system is designed so we can't have a strategic dialogue.'⁵ A strategic partnership would encompass regular, shared assessments of key security threats, the ability to deal with the daily grind of immediate policy demands while pursuing long-term priorities related to ensuring security, prosperity and values, and the capacity to harness the full range of resources in building complementary responses to common challenges. Today, we do not have that relationship.⁶

Instead, the US-EU relationship is often pursued as a kind of technocratic exercise in which laundry lists of deliverables put forward by a range of agencies are heralded and then forgotten. There is little sense of urgency or overall direction, and issues seem to rise on the agenda in a disparate and unpredictable fashion. To be fair, there are instances of considerable success, such as when US and EU agencies share information, work together to counter the financing of terrorism, cooperate on customs procedures, and, in some cases, exchange liaison officers. But those issues tend to be caught up in high-profile, occasional dust-ups. In early 2010, new US-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance entered into force. Of course, each side has concerns which have hampered full cooperation, for instance European unease over data privacy⁷ and treatment of US detainees; opposition to death penalty provisions in some US states, or congressionally-mandated provisions for 100 percent screening of US-bound cargo containers. US authorities, in turn, have been concerned that rendition-related criminal proceedings against US officials in some EU states could put vital counterterrorism cooperation at risk.

For the most part, however, the transatlantic homeland security agenda has fallen victim to *ad hoc*, reactive responses that are not commensurate with the challenges at hand or the depth of our interdependencies.

5. Cited in Daniel Hamilton, (ed.), *Shoulder to Shoulder – Forging a Strategic US-EU Partnership* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2010).

6. Ibid.; see also Ronald D. Asmus, 'New Plumbing, New Purposes – Rebuilding the Transatlantic Alliance', *American Interest*, November/December 2008.

7. In early 2010, the European Parliament voted against final approval of the SWIFT agreement on the grounds that it did not sufficiently protect the privacy of citizens' personal data. The US and the EU subsequently re-negotiated the agreement with added safeguards, and the European Parliament approved the new version in July 2010. Some observers assert that a broader US-EU framework agreement on principles of privacy and data protection would help ease European concerns and promote closer cooperation.

Although we have plenty of transnational institutions at our disposal, we are not harnessing those institutions to forge cooperation across a range of policies. Although political attention is occasionally raised over transatlantic agreements, there is no overarching vision to guide and benchmark ongoing work between agencies and bureaucracies. And although we understand the thick web of functional interdependencies between us, we have limited tools at our disposal in only a scattered number of policy areas (e.g. container security, data exchange, terrorist financing). Considering the mutual damage that could be done if the vital arteries crossing the Atlantic were to be disrupted, more needs to be done.

We propose framing our joint efforts towards building transatlantic resilience in a common area of freedom, justice and security. The concept of resilience, gaining ground in policy debates and research environments on both sides of the Atlantic, is defined as the ability to regain functionality swiftly after a disturbance. Achieving resilience requires heterogeneity in systems, processes and responses and an improved understanding of how those systems work. It is not simply a matter of dealing with consequences; anticipation and pre-emption are crucial. A strategy of resilience seeks to ensure that the basic structures and critical functions of our interconnected societies remain strong and can continue even in the face of natural or man-made disasters.⁸ This suggests advanced work to strengthen, and/or build redundancies, into transatlantic arteries operating at the technical, social and even political levels. Initiatives at each level must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy with a clearly identifiable goal: achieving transatlantic resilience in a common area of freedom, justice and security.

Recent developments in both the US and EU bode well for a resilience agenda. The US is more willing of late to contemplate shared vulnerabilities and shared responses. Chastened by poor international coordination following 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, the US changed many traditional inward-looking approaches and procedures and has reached out to its neighbours and to other partners to improve joint prevention, preparation and response activities.⁹ In November 2011, the US and EU conducted a joint readiness exercise using the scenario of a common cyber attack and signed a partnership agreement on cooperation towards disaster risk reduction and response.¹⁰

For its part, the EU has grown into a 'worthy partner' over the past ten years through an expanded role in protecting European citizens and critical infrastructures. Across the EU's many policy competences, security and safety measures as diverse as food contamination regulations and explosive substance controls are being adopted to flank the functional regulations of the internal market.¹¹ These initiatives have developed alongside more explicit security initiatives related to counterterrorism,

8. Mark Rhinard and Bengt Sundelius, 'The Limits of Self-Reliance: International Cooperation as a Source of Resilience', in Louise Comfort, Arjen Boin and Chris Demchak (eds.), *Designing Resilience: Preparing for Extreme Events* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2010); Arjen Boin, 'Enhancing Societal Security in the Face of Transboundary Crises: Pointers for Transatlantic Cooperation,' unpublished paper prepared for Center for Transatlantic Relations/PACER, January 2009.
9. Anne C. Richard, *Role Reversal: Offers of Help from Other Countries in Response to Hurricane Katrina* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2007).
10. For the cyber attack readiness exercise, see Commission Press Release IP/11/1305, 3 November 2011 ('Digital Agenda: EU & US conduct readiness tests for cyber attacks in "Cyber Atlantic 2011": EU-US cooperation on disaster risk reduction and response cooperation is reported in Commission Press Release IP/11/1365, 17 November 2011 ('Cooperation in disaster management: the European Union and the United States take a major step forward'). Although both efforts are a step in the right direction, they are emblematic of *ad hoc* approaches which, as we argue below, should be joined up in a more strategic framework.
11. Arjen Boin and Mark Rhinard, 'What Role for the European Union in Transboundary Crisis Management?', *International Studies Review*, vol. 10, no. 1, 2008, pp. 1-26.

air security, cybercrime, explosives, and borders (to name just a few). No less than four high-level strategic agreements have been put in place in recent years, including the External Security Strategy (2003), the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005), the Solidarity Clause (2009), and the Internal Security Strategy (2010). The treaty-level ‘Solidarity Clause’ (Art. 222, TFEU) is especially noteworthy, given that EU Member States have pledged mutual support in the face of a range of new threats. That clause obliges governments to jointly assess new threats, to coordinate themselves closely in the event of an attack, and to provide mutual assistance to a stricken state.¹² Taken together, these documents craft a vision of the EU’s responsibilities in an increasingly complex global security environment and prioritise cooperation and multilateral solutions. While none of these initiatives will replace national prevention and response responsibilities in Europe, they are highly compatible with a resilience agenda.

Moving forward

European Commissioner Cecilia Malmström has made the case clearly and directly: ‘an attack on Baltimore is as much an attack on Berlin or Brussels. Our societies are so open and interlinked that no matter if an attack occurs in Europe or the US we will both pay the price’.¹³ We echo that sentiment and go one step further in calling for a Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge: a commitment by the EU and US to act in a spirit of solidarity – refusing to remain passive – if either is the object of an attack, the victim of disaster or exposed by a breakdown in critical infrastructure. Reflecting the orientation of the EU’s Solidarity Clause, both sides would commit to mobilising all instruments at their disposal to:

- Prevent imminent threats;
- Protect democratic institutions and civilian populations from threat; and
- Assist one another at the request of the respective political leadership in the event of an attack, disaster or societal-wide breakdown.

Implementation of a Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge is predicated on a common threat assessment (such as the one required by the EU’s Solidarity Clause) and would require EU and US officials to acknowledge, evaluate and prioritise threats to the shared arteries spanning the Atlantic. Threat assessment could be used as a guide for ongoing capacity building in the form of advanced planning and prevention in line with a resilience approach.¹⁴ Yet the Pledge would also require

12. Sara Myrdal and Mark Rhinard, ‘Empty Letter or Effective Tool? Implementing the EU’s Solidarity Clause’, *UI Occasional Paper* no. 2 (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2010).

13. Cecilia Malmström, ‘The EU Internal Security Strategy – what does it mean for the United States?’ Speech to the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, 8 December 2010.

14. Transatlantic risk assessment could be grouped in terms of economic, geopolitical, technological, societal and environmental risks. Working under the ‘first, do no harm’ principle, officials in the EU and US must assess how such risks are likely to disrupt critical arteries, and what joint initiatives are necessary to improve resilience.

thinking through operational response requirements in the event of a major transatlantic breakdown.

A Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge would fill an important gap in the transatlantic community's deep and integrated relationship. At the moment, the only commitment Americans and Europeans have to each other is through NATO, and that commitment is defined in the North Atlantic Treaty as response to 'armed attack.' Yet the types of disruptive challenges we face today do not fall easily under traditional definitions of 'armed attack.' In addition, most of these challenges are more civilian than military. Moreover, the US and the EU have no equivalent commitment to each other. If the relationship is truly to be strategic and effective, the partners would also underpin their activities with a binding sense of common purpose.

Adopted by political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, a pledge would signal an appreciation of the complexity of modern threats, the interconnectedness of European and American societies, and the willingness of the EU and US to stand together in a shifting world. It would signal mutual recognition of the need for democratic societies to complement traditional approaches geared to protecting territory with high-priority efforts to protect critical functions of society. More specifically, a Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge would create key preconditions for advancing overall resilience: political impetus, bureaucratic guidance and operational mechanisms towards that goal.

Although total political attention to a particular topic is never possible (or perhaps desirable), transatlantic attention to building a common area of freedom, security and justice has declined significantly. NATO has taken the latest initiative in reconstructing its strategic concept while EU-US relations across a much broader spectrum of issues have languished. This is unfortunate, since officials throughout government are at least partly influenced in their own work by high-level signals and priority-setting. Agreement on a Transatlantic Security Pledge would boost political impetus across the spectrum and recalibrate security cooperation towards a clear purpose: building resilience into transatlantic infrastructures. A high-profile pledge of this nature would help rebuild a sense of common cause across the Atlantic and set priorities to prevent or prepare for any future crisis. This impetus could carry over into diplomatic initiatives in the 'alphabet soup' of transatlantic cooperation frameworks directed at improving coherence through strategic direction.

At the bureaucratic level, a Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge could set the framework for improved technical cooperation among European and US agencies and departments. This level of cooperation, which currently takes place but needs new bearings, should focus on the

key transatlantic infrastructures most susceptible to attack and/or disruption. Our studies boil those infrastructures down to five key arteries carrying energy, people, money, goods and services, and data across the Atlantic upon which transatlantic societies rely.¹⁵ Focus must be placed on the ways these arteries can be made not just more robust – but also more resilient – in the face of disruptions. A focus on these arteries – including how to enhance resilience and manage complicated cross-over disruptions – could guide work related to implementing a Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge.

Towards that end, a renewed focus on coordination could be placed on relations between EU and US operation centres – with the task of providing early warning, situational awareness and crisis coordination support. Such centres could include the DHS National Operations Center (NOC), FEMA's National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the EU Monitoring and Information Centre (EU MIC) and the EU Situation Centre (SitCen) in Brussels. These objectives require regular exercises between EU and US officials to familiarise themselves with procedures and protocols in working together. Other needs include joint investigation teams, including Europol and Eurojust, to cooperate on cases that cross international borders; enhanced cooperation between the US Coast Guard and related agencies with Frontex, the EU border protection agency; collaboration on resilience-related research for instance between the European Security Research and Innovation Forum (ESRIF) and similar US efforts; and development of a EU-US Critical Vulnerabilities Security Action Plan to generate mutually supporting strategies to address their own critical foreign vulnerabilities.

Guidance for technical cooperation includes renewed focus on improving relations between public agencies and the private sector. The private sector owns most of these infrastructures – both actual facilities and networks – yet has its own views of protection that may differ from those of governments. For example, global movement systems are integrally linked in today's highly networked and interconnected global economy. The drive to improve efficiency has made these global movement systems more vulnerable not only to attack by terrorists, but to cybercrime and even natural disasters and extreme weather. A EU-US public-private Global Movement Management Initiative (GMMI) could offer an innovative governance framework to align security and resilience with commercial imperatives in global movement systems, including shipping, air transport, and even the internet.¹⁶ And if the EU and US could achieve agreement, the norms and standards that would emerge could provide a framework for global arrangements. A Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge would generate new impetus for the public and private sectors to work together to advance overall resilience.

15. See, for instance, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen and Daniel S. Hamilton, *Transatlantic Homeland Security* (London/ New York: Routledge, 2006); Esther Brimmer (ed.), *Transforming Homeland Security: US and European Approaches* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2006); Antonio Missiroli (ed.), 'Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: a new D-drive for the EU', *Chaillot Paper* no. 83 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2005); Robert Whalley, 'Improving International Co-ordination and Co-Operation on Homeland Security/Societal Security and Resilience Issues,' unpublished paper prepared for Center for Transatlantic Relations/PACER, January 2009; Jonathan M. Winer, 'An Initial International Cooperation Agenda on High Consequence Events for the Obama Administration,' unpublished paper prepared for Center for Transatlantic Relations/PACER, January 2009.

16. This idea is drawn from a report by IBM Global Business Services, 'Global Movement Management: Commerce, Security, and Resilience in Today's Networked World,' and a 2005 paper entitled 'Global Movement Management: Security the Global Economy,' available through www.ibm.com/gbs/government. See also Stephen E. Flynn and Daniel B. Prieto, *Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006).

An EU-US Transatlantic Resilience Council – operating at a similar level as the Transatlantic Economic Council and the Transatlantic Energy Council – could be formed to operationalise this initiative, integrating the discussion on homeland security, justice and freedom across all sectors and serving as a cross-sector forum for strategic deliberations about threats, vulnerabilities, and response and recovery capacities that cut across sectors and borders. This group would complement existing professional work within established but bureaucratically fragmented fora, such as the Policy Dialogue on Borders and Transportation Security. Although we recognise that new institutions are not the first imperative for building resilience, we are convinced that some degree of structured oversight between both blocs is needed to provide strategic perspective on where EU-US cooperation is working and where more attention is needed.

In sum, a Transatlantic Solidarity Pledge, coupled to a concerted package of focused initiatives, would generate the necessary political attention, administrative direction, and operational mechanisms to bind the transatlantic relationship tighter in a time of increasing threat complexity and global flux. It would reaffirm the continued vibrancy of the transatlantic partnership, yet tune it to new times and new challenges. It would guide bureaucracies and balance the traditional focus on ‘pursue and protect’ strategies with a greater focus on prevention and response. The need to prepare for resilience in advance while being ready for effective, joint crisis response is the essence of the initiative and is unlikely to generate significant political opposition on either side of the Atlantic. It signals the need – and the pathway – for two historical partners to renew and reenergise their relationship for a new global context. Our ultimate goal should be a resilient Euro-Atlantic area of justice, freedom, and security that balances mobility and civil liberties with societal resilience.

International resilience efforts must be driven by the transatlantic community, because no two continents are as deeply connected as the two sides of the North Atlantic. The US and the EU are each enmeshed, of course, in a much broader web of inter-continental networks – but the transatlantic relationship is the thickest weave in the web. In terms of values and interests, economic interactions and human bonds, the EU and the US are closer to one another than either is to any other major international actor. And if the two actors who are most similar cannot organise themselves together to safeguard their deep connectedness, it is highly unlikely that either side would be able to be very successful doing the same with other systems much less like its own. Successful transatlantic efforts, on the other hand, can serve as the core of more effective global measures – based on norms and standards that can protect our people while reflecting our values.