

Chapter Two

National Integration and National Identity in Ukraine

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The issue of regionalism is extremely important in understanding Ukrainian politics and geopolitics. Most of Ukraine suffered from three centuries of overt Russification (culminating in the 1876 Ems Decree that banned all publications in the Ukrainian language as well as public readings and stage performances) and subtle Russification in the Soviet Union, which was especially prevalent in south and east of the country.

On the other hand, most of Western Ukraine was part of the Austrian-Hungarian empire before 1918, then part of Poland in the inter-war period, and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939-1940. This region underwent Russification for only about 40 years and, therefore, in its traditions, political culture, geopolitical orientations this region is quite similar to the three Baltic states.¹

In this situation, independent Ukraine faces the challenge to build simultaneously not only a democracy and market economy but also state institutions, and a modern civic nation; that is, a “quadruple transition.”² The fundamental nature of such a transition ensures it is more difficult compared to Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic countries, an important fact which is quite often overlooked by Western policy-makers. In a nutshell, national integration is an important precursor for successful introduction of democratic and economic reforms.

¹ It is important to stress that since 2004, not only Western but also Central Ukraine votes for Orange and post-Orange political forces.

² See Taras Kuzio, “The National Factor in Ukraine’s Quadruple Transition,” *Contemporary Politics*, Vol.6. No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 143-164.

Towards the end of the Soviet regime, in 1990, only 45% of pupils studied in Ukrainian, and in higher education about 90% of subjects were taught in Russian. In independent Ukraine, the Russification of education has been halted. Nevertheless, in 2009 18% of pupils were studying in Russian, and if one considers those who study the Russian language as a subject the figure increases to more than 45%.³

In higher education, 12% of Ukraine's students (as of 2009) studied in Russian, but the actual figure is higher (it is difficult to determine exact figures as one professor can teach in Russian, another in Ukrainian). The numbers for higher education in Ukrainian drop dramatically in the eastern and southern regions. In the Crimea, Ukrainians comprise 24% of the population, but only 7% of pupils are taught in Ukrainian. In vocational schools in the Crimea all subjects are taught in Russian, 90% of university students study in Russian, and in the Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk *oblasts*)—50%. More than 40% of all books in circulation in Ukraine are in Russian (as of 2009) and given the large volume of book imports from Russia the figure rises to 90%. Two-thirds of the country's newspapers and 90% of journals, and half of TV programs are in Russian.⁴

The Russian language still dominates in the business sphere and mass entertainment. Despite articles in the 1996 Constitution, which stipulates Ukrainian is the only official state language, many deputies do not bother to learn Ukrainian and continue to speak Russian in parliament. Therefore, making Russian a second state language, as some politicians (including Viktor Yanukovich as candidate for president in 2004 and 2010) advocate, would threaten the existence of the Ukrainian language.

In the late 1980s, when Ukraine was on the path to independence, there were attempts by the KGB and elements within the Communist Party to halt this by making territorial claims on Kyiv. The pretext that was used was the claim that current Ukrainian borders were formed during World War II (as a result of the Soviet invasion of Poland and the threat of force against Romania following the Molo-

³ Most figures on the language situation are taken from *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, August 15, 2009 and September, 25, 2010.

⁴ *Ibid.*

tov-Ribbentrop Pact). Territorial claims were not dominant in the political life of most of Ukraine's neighbors. In their turn, the leaders of the Ukrainian state and its national-democratic opposition were in favor of the principle of inviolability of postwar borders. This principle is seen as a *sine qua non* of Ukrainian foreign policy and all Ukrainian presidents have supported the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova.⁵ In September 2008, Yanukovich and the Party of Regions did though support Russia's recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhaz independence through resolutions in the Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments (the former failed but the latter was adopted).

Despite predictions on the eve of Ukrainian independence based on the depth of Russification of eastern Ukraine, the country did not split even in the most difficult crisis year in 1993 when hyper-inflation soared to 10,000%. Polls taken in 1994 showed that only 1% of respondents in Lviv and 5% in Donetsk (the main cities in the west and the east of Ukraine, respectively) wanted Ukraine to cease to exist as a united nation. According to polls conducted by the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology, after a short decline in 1993 the number of those who support Ukraine's independence has returned to the level of the 1991 referendum result.⁶

The risk of ethnic confrontation within Ukraine diminishes as ethno-linguistic boundaries are blurred, and the Russian and Ukrainian languages are closely related. In fact, the very division of Russian and Ukrainian-language speakers is to a certain extent exaggerated because most of the population is bilingual. The younger generation of Ukrainians knows Russian even if half of them do not study it at school because Russian TV programs are broadcast in Ukraine and most radio programs in Ukraine are still conducted in Russian or in both languages.

As for the question of citizenship, Ukrainian leaders adopted in October 1991 the "zero option" where everyone living in Ukraine was

⁵ Moldovans comprise only 32% of the self-proclaimed Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, while Russians make up 30% of the population and Ukrainians 29%; before 1940 this region was the Moldovan Autonomous SSR within the Ukrainian SSR.

⁶ Valerii Khmelko, *Suverenitet yak zabalnonatzionalna tzinnist: sotziolobichnyj aspekt*. <http://www.kiis.com.ua/pub/2011/sverenitet.pdf>.

eligible for citizenship without any pre-conditions. Thus, Ukrainian citizens' socio-economic and political opportunities were not limited or circumscribed by ethno-linguistic criteria. In fact, Ukraine stands in contrast to many other former Soviet republics in that it gained its independence peacefully and without interethnic conflict. This was a result of firstly, a compromise between the national-democratic opposition and national-communists and secondly, tolerant interaction between *Rukh* (the Ukrainian Popular Movement established in 1989) and ethnic minorities.⁷ In its preamble, Ukraine's 1996 Constitution defined "the Ukrainian people" as "citizens of Ukraine of all nationalities."

Thus, modern Ukrainian civic nationalism is based upon territorial, not ethnic, criteria and "inclusive" rather than "exclusive" citizenship. The results of the 2001 census (the first to be held in independent Ukraine) showed a slow Ukrainization of Russophone Ukrainians. Compared to the 1989 Soviet census, the number of ethnic Ukrainians increased from 72.7% to 77.8 % while the number of ethnic Russians decreased from 22.1% to 17.3 %, which was signified a return to the ethnic composition of Ukraine found in 1959 Soviet census.

But, the number of those who consider Russian as their "mother tongue" is higher—29.6% and the Russian language still dominates in the eastern and southern regions of the country. Russian-speaking politicians do not feel excluded from the political process in Kyiv and they feel it is more realistic to compete for power and resources in Kyiv rather than in Moscow. Ukraine's independence elevated the status of what had previously been a provincial Soviet republican elite and became the basis for political and business elites irrespective of the language they speak.⁸ Ukraine is also regionally and politically diverse which prevents a single political force to monopolize power (or "pluralism by default").

⁷ Many Jewish dissidents supported Ukrainian dissidents and the creation of *Rukh*. In turn, *Rukh* issued a special appeal to Jews, Russians, and Crimean Tatars and established a Council of Nationalities within *Rukh*.

⁸ Characteristically, Ukraine's second President, Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004), relearned Ukrainian (which he had forgotten during his years at university and in the military-industrial complex). Kuchma published a book in Russian and Ukrainian titled *Ukraine Is not Russia* in which he explained why the Russian language cannot receive state status.

Although the electoral divide between the south and the east, on the one hand, and west and the center of Ukraine, on the other, has been evident in every election since 1990 (the only exception is the 1999 presidential election), there are signs that major players are moving into regions that have traditionally supported their opponents. At the same time, radical nationalist forces (both Russian and Ukrainian) have not received votes above the 3% parliamentary threshold.

Russian Influence and Polarization of the Country Since 2004

Despite three centuries of shared existence in one state with Russia, Ukrainian politics cannot be explained by its intertwined history and culture (or the “clash of civilizations” approach according to which only Western Ukraine belongs to Western civilization) or even by its economic dependence on Russia. Ukrainian politics is the result of the correlation of domestic political forces and the position of the Ukrainian elites.

Moscow and Kyiv viewed the future of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established on December 8, 1991, from opposite perspectives—as “reintegration” or a “civilized divorce,” respectively. Ukraine has not ratified the CIS Charter and therefore, despite being one of its founding states, Ukraine is not formally a member of the CIS. Ukraine also refused to sign the 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security and Kyiv only has observer status in the Eurasian Economic Community which was launched in 2000.

During Leonid Kuchma’s 1994 election campaign he referred several times to the so-called ‘Eurasian space.’ Two central issues in his campaign were increasing Ukraine’s cooperation with Russia, first of all in the economic sphere, and granting official status for the Russian language. However, very soon after his election victory Kuchma pursued policies that strengthened the Ukrainian state to a greater extent than Ukraine’s first President Leonid Kravchuk. He defeated separatist forces in the Crimea and in 1997 signed both the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership with Russia (which finally recognized Ukraine’s borders!) and NATO-Ukrainian Charter on Distinctive Partnership. Balancing between Russia and the West and pursuing a policy of “multi-vector diplomacy,” Kuchma pursued inte-

gration of Ukraine with the West while cooperating with the CIS. While distancing himself from his predecessor, whose policies he judged to be “nationalistic,” Kuchma at the same time had to take into consideration the position of those who had voted for Kravchuk in western and central Ukraine.

One of the main reasons for Viktor Yushchenko’s election in 2004 were slogans common to the whole country that appealed to European values, social justice, rule of law, and struggle against corruption. Kuchma’s administration did everything possible to prevent Yushchenko from winning the 2004 elections by presenting him as a radical nationalist who would “oppress” the Russian-speaking population, whereas Yanukovych was portrayed as a great friend of Russia. Yanukovych’s Russian and Ukrainian election consultants also promoted the idea of a “schism” in Ukraine between the “nationalistic” West and “industrial” East, depicting Yushchenko in fascist uniform or Ukraine divided into three segregated parts. They also launched an anti-Western, anti-American campaign. The Russian president and Russian election consultants openly supported the Yanukovych campaign, and President Putin twice congratulated Yanukovych on his falsified victory. The country emerged from the 2004 elections extremely polarized with tensions that had already built up between national democratic and Russophone political parties on the increase since the November 2000 Kuchmagate crisis.

Although the “Russian factor” continues to play an important role in Ukrainian domestic politics, Moscow could not prevent Yushchenko’s victory in 2004 or the 2007 pre-term elections which removed Yanukovych as prime minister.

Ukraine’s economic dependence on Russia has also decreased. Although Russia remains the main trading country for Ukraine, its proportion of Ukrainian trade declined dramatically from 47.5 % in 1994 to 23.05 % in pre-crisis 2008. Exports to Russia fell from 37.4 % in 1994 to 23.5 % in 2008, and imports from 58.1 % to 22.7%. But in absolute figures the trading situation is different as trade with Russia fell from \$17.8 billion in 1994 to \$11.7 billion, but then increased in 2004 to \$17.7 billion, and \$35.2 billion in 2008. Therefore, contrary to what Russian leaders say about the “anti-Russian” nature of the Orange administration which allegedly opposed cooperation with

Russia, trade doubled from 2004 to 2008. Ukrainian exports to Russia grew from \$5.9 billion to \$15.7 billion (that is in 2.7 times) and imports from \$11.8 billion to \$19.4 billion.⁹

Despite the good and growing economic interaction between Ukraine and Russia an ideological war continued unabated with Moscow continuing to wage massive propaganda campaigns against Ukraine to discredit its democratic experiment. As an example, on May 19, 2009, Russian President Dmitrii Medvedev issued a decree establishing “a Presidential Commission to combat efforts to reinterpret history in ways that damage Russia’s interests.”¹⁰ Russian propaganda continued in the Soviet tradition of portraying the Ukrainian national liberation movement as ‘fascist and anti-semitic’.¹¹

As a result of such campaigns, according to a poll conducted by the Russian Levada Center in January-February 2009, 62% of Russians viewed Ukraine in a negative way and Ukraine rose to third on the list of “unfriendly states” after the U.S. and Georgia. At the same time, 90% of Ukrainians retained a positive attitude towards Russia as there was no concerted, state-led anti-Russian campaign by the Yushchenko administration.¹²

President Yushchenko: Good Slogans, Counterproductive Policies

Yushchenko’s accent on issues of social justice in the 2004 campaign helped to overcome the anti-Western stereotypes and polarizing strategies of his opponents. Following his victory Ukraine needed long-awaited reforms, including unpopular ones and it was important to show that new leaders were fighting corruption at the highest levels

⁹ The data is taken from official sites www.ukrstat.gov.ua and www.me.gov.ua.

¹⁰ Commission members included the head of the Presidential Administration along with the chief of staff of the Armed Forces, the deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, the deputy secretary of the National Security Council, representatives from the Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal Security Service, and other ministries.

¹¹ Moscow promoted this stereotype in the Western media as well. See, for example, Moses Fishbein, “The Jewish Card in Russian Special Operations against Ukraine,” <http://maysterni.com/publication.php?id=35257>.

¹² *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, February 27, 2010.

and within their own ‘inner circle’. Such a public perception would have given them the moral authority to ask Ukrainians to ‘tighten their belts’. However, the fight against corruption remained on paper and virtual, as it was under Kuchma and remains the case under the Yanukovich administration.

If reforms had been successful, it would have been possible to raise issues which otherwise would not normally receive sufficient support in the country. On the contrary, when in 2008 Yushchenko’s ratings declined to 3-5% it was counter-productive to raise the issue of entering NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) merely serving to play into the hands of the opposition which increasingly mobilized around anti-Western slogans.

Paradoxically, support for Ukrainian membership in NATO was higher under Kuchma than under Yushchenko. Polls by the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center for Economic and Political Studies showed that in June 2002 the numbers of those who supported joining NATO and those against were nearly equal—approximately 32% each. In July 2009, at the end of Yushchenko’s term, only 20% supported NATO membership while 59% opposed this step.¹³ Under Yushchenko, the agreement on Ukraine’s accession to WTO was finalized and ratified in 2008. But as there were no economic successes within the country, the step was used by the opposition to blame Orange forces “for selling out Ukraine to the West.”

Yanukovich mobilized the Party of Regions and eastern Ukrainian Russophone voters against Yushchenko’s policies in support of European and Euro-Atlantic integration, respect for Ukrainian history, culture, and language, the need to overcome divisions in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and mutual respect in Ukrainian-Russian relations. Con-

¹³http://razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=46. The figure of 32% was a good launch for an informational campaign compared with some Central-Eastern European countries (i.e., Slovakia or Bulgaria) or Spain (when it joined NATO in 1982 public support stood at only 18%). The decrease in public support can be explained by an intensive anti-Western, anti-American campaign supported by Russia and key figures in Kuchma’s entourage in the 2004 elections. It is important, however, to stress that up to 90% of Ukrainian security experts are in favor of joining NATO. While disapproving NATO membership 53% of Ukrainians, at the same time, do not consider NATO to be a threat (according to an April 2009 Razumkov Center poll).

trary to the lessons of the 2004 election campaign, when Yushchenko avoided polarizing issues, his presidency and 2010 presidential campaign deeply divided Ukrainian society. In the 2010 elections he received only 5% of the vote and fifth place.

The paradox is that negotiations with the EU for an Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) were boosted only *after* Orange forces lost the 2010 presidential elections and Ukraine under Yanukovich suffered from democratic regression. Therefore, if the negotiations will end successfully it would be the new anti-Orange regime which could claim credit for Ukraine's European integration.

Federalization or Real Local Self-Government?

The idea of federalization for Ukraine was put forward in 1989 by, among others, Vyacheslav Chornovil, a former dissident and then the head of Rukh. However, during Ukraine's drive to independence the Soviet authorities tried to use this idea to polarize the country and mobilize separatist movements. During the first years of Ukrainian independence it became clear that federalization, attractive as a model for a democratic and multicultural society, could encourage centrifugal tendencies in Ukraine. Therefore, Chornovil very soon changed his initial position and dropped his support. The 1996 constitution did not include the idea of federalization or Russian as a state language. National-democrats, pro-business centrists and the moderate left-in parliament joined forces to adopt the constitution.

During and after the Orange Revolution the Party of Regions also used the idea of federalization to secure its position in its electoral strongholds, to challenge the Orange authorities in Kyiv and also as an election campaign slogan. Given the regional polarization of the country, the absence of administrative-territorial reform and, therefore, a weak financial basis for self-government, federalization could lead not to the development of self-government but to regional "feudalization" of the country. The key issue is to strengthen self-government at the local level: village, town, *rayon* (district).

The country's main political forces agree on the necessity of this step although characteristically, the Party of Regions has after coming

Table 1. Would You Like to Have Your Region Separated From Ukraine and Joined to Another State?

Percent	West	Center	South	East
Yes	3.4	1.4	11.6	10.4
No	91.3	93.1	75.1	77.9
Difficult to answer	5.3	5.5	13.3	11.7

The poll was taken by the Razumkov Center on May 31 – June 18, 2007. 10956 respondents aged above 18 years were polled in all regions of Ukraine. The sample theoretical error does not exceed 1% (www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=318)

Ukraine's regions are defined as follows: South — Autonomous Republic of Crimea; Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaiv oblasts; Center — Kyiv; Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Khmelnytsky, Cherkasy, and Chernihiv oblasts; West – Volyn, Zakarpattia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi oblasts; East – Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Kharkiv oblasts.

to power avoids mentioning “federalization” in its program. It is important to stress that Ukrainian surveys and polls show that separatist ideas were overwhelmingly rejected throughout the whole country (see table 1).

Crimean Autonomy

The August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia raised again the issue if Russia can play the separatist card in Crimea as it is the only region in Ukraine where ethnic Russians comprise a majority of the population (58%). It is also the historic land of Crimean Tatars, who were deported by Stalin in 1944 to Central Asia and were only allowed to return to the peninsula after 1989 and today constitute 12% of the Crimea's population. Russia's Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol, extended in April 2010 until 2042–2047, remains an instrument of pressure on Ukraine. The Russian consulate has been issuing passports to Ukrainian citizens in Odessa and Crimea, although dual citizenship is prohibited in Ukraine. Nevertheless, it would be premature to extrapolate the “South Ossetian/Abkhazian” scenario to the Crimea.

The rights of ethnic Russians are not under threat in the Crimea (although this is often raised by Russia and pro-Russian forces in Crimea). It is the Ukrainian language and culture that need state support in the Crimea, not Russian (see above). According to the March 2011 poll by the Razumkov Center, 70% of Crimeans consider Ukraine

as their Motherland. For the Crimean elites (most of whom are members of all-Ukrainian parties) it is much more profitable to stay within Ukraine and to negotiate with both Kyiv and Moscow. If the Crimea was part of authoritarian Russia it would lose this bargaining position.

The position of the Crimean Tatars is crucial for the future of Crimea and regional stability. Since the end of the 1980s, Rukh and the Crimean Tatars have supported each other. Crimean Tatar leaders were elected to the Ukrainian parliament within Rukh and subsequently on the list of the Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc.

But, if Crimean Tatars feel their rights are not protected, first of all in being given land to build homes, this could strengthen radicals outside the Mejlis (the Crimean Tatar parliament), which for decades has managed to maintain the movement as a moderate and non-violent force. In general, Ukraine's tolerant attitude towards Crimean Tatars is in sharp contrast to the spread of anti-Islamic rhetoric in Russia.

Finally, any large-scale conflict over the Crimea would provoke a strong reaction from the international community, to a far greater degree than that which happened in South Ossetia. However, Moscow could exploit the situation in the Crimea to destabilize the region in order to pressure Kyiv and hinder Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration. That is what happened when Ukraine sought a NATO Membership Action Plan in 2008, after which anti-NATO demonstrations were organized in the Crimea. Hardliners in Russia could organize clashes between Crimea's ethnic Russians and Crimean Tatars over land or with Ukrainian nationalist organizations over the Sevastopol Black Sea Fleet naval base.

Religious Divisions: The Split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy

Most Ukrainian believers (about 2/3) are members of Orthodox churches. The Greek Catholic Church (which was underground from 1945-1990) is concentrated in Western Ukraine and comprises about 1/5 of religious believers.¹⁴ There are also Roman Catholic, Protestant, Judaic and Muslim believers in Ukraine.

¹⁴See, the 2006 poll by the Razumkov Center at www.uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=300.

The Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine split after Ukraine became independent leading to the emergence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) which supports the idea of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church independent from Moscow. However, this church is not recognized by other canonical Orthodox Churches nor by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which, in terms of the number of parishes, remains the largest church in Ukraine.

The UOC-MP enjoys autonomy, including the right to form its own Synod and appoint bishops without formal approval of the Moscow Patriarch. Some of its bishops support the idea of a united, autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Between 2007 and 2009, the UOC-MP and Kyiv Patriarchate opened a cautious dialogue which was cancelled after Yanukovych was elected. In November 2008, the UOC-MP Synod pronounced the 1933 artificial famine in Ukraine (*holodomor*) as a genocide of the Ukrainian people, a stance that strongly contradicts Russia’s denial of an artificial famine unique to Ukraine. But, these are only initial steps. Patriarch Kiril of the Russian Orthodox Church is seeking to limit the autonomy of the UOC-MP. On the other side, there are signals that the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople may recognize the autocephaly of the UOC-MP which will open the way for its unification with the UOC-KP.

President Yanukovych: A Second Round of Regional Polarization

In the 2010 presidential elections Yanukovych’s team mobilized around public disillusionment into the performance of Orange governments. His campaign also exploited slogans from the 2004 elections for mobilizing the regional electorate in the east and south of the country, including anti-NATO sentiments, promises to make Russian a second state language, and insistence that there was no falsified vote in 2004 when “our victory was stolen.” Yanukovych even mentioned the possibility of recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a step totally in contrast with other Ukrainian presidents who made the territorial integrity of states a cardinal principle in Ukrainian politics.

As a result of this electoral rhetoric, the country was again polarized, this time by Yanukovych. In the second round in February 2010 Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko won in 16 regions and the capital, while Yanukovych won only in 9 regions and the city of Sevastopol. Despite his election promises to seek to overcome Ukraine's regional divisions his steps merely served to deepen them.

The April 2010 Kharkiv Accords with Russia permit the lease of the Russian naval base in Sevastopol for an additional 25 years (after the 1997 agreement expires in 2017) and prolong it after 2042 for another 5 years. This was signed even though it infringed the Ukrainian constitution, which declares there should be no foreign military troops on Ukrainian soil on a permanent basis. The decision was approved in parliament against the advice of three parliamentary committees and without necessary discussions, provoking a riot.

One of the most symbolic concessions to Russia was on the NATO question (see the chapter by Stephen Larrabee). Under Kuchma the position of the Party of Regions was quite conformist and in the *Strategy for Ukraine for 2004-2015* prepared under the auspices of then Prime Minister Yanukovych, the deadline for joining NATO was set at 2008. The Party of Regions unanimously voted in 2003 for the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security which clearly states that Ukraine's aim is to join NATO as well as a Memorandum with NATO to provide it with support in multinational exercises and peacekeeping operations. In 2006, during Yanukovych's second premiership, the Party of Regions supported the Memorandum with NATO on the participation of Ukraine's strategic transport aviation in NATO operations. This demonstrates that anti-NATO election campaigns by the Party of Regions were populist and designed to mobilize their electorate.

However, on July 2, 2010, the new law on Fundamentals of Domestic and Foreign Policy of Ukraine was adopted by parliament that proclaimed a non-bloc status for Ukraine aimed at establishing good relations with the Russian leadership. Yanukovych also played on the ambivalent geopolitical orientations of Ukrainians. According to a April 2010 poll by the Institute of Sociology, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, 62% were in favor of Ukraine joining the union of Russia and Belarus (negative attitude dominated only in Western Ukraine). The explanation is that this union is associated with cooper-

Table 2. How Do You Assess Ukraine's Entry to the European Union?

Percent

	West	Center	South	East	Ukraine
Rather negative	6.6	16.7	22.1	28.2	19.1
Difficult to answer	27.3	38.2	41.5	33.3	35.3
Rather positive	66.1	45.1	36.4	38.5	45.5

April 2010 poll of Institute of Sociology, Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences <http://www.niss.gov.ua/articles/457/>.

ation and visa-free travel. Simultaneously, as seen in Table 2, in all regions the number of those who support Ukraine's accession to the EU exceeds the number of opponents (the paradox is that the highest support was not under Yushchenko, but in 2000-2001 under Kuchma, when anti-Western campaigns has not yet been launched).

In the educational sphere Yanukovych also made concessions which helped Russia to strengthen its ideological influence in the region. In April 2010, during his visit to the Council of Europe in Strasburg, Yanukovych rejected the view that of the *holodomor* as genocide.¹⁵ The appointment of Dmytro Tabachnyk as Minister of Education came after he was lobbied by Patriarch Kiril. His promotion served to polarize the country in the cultural-linguistic sphere as he is known for pejorative statements regarding the Ukrainian intelligentsia and for Soviet interpretations of Ukrainian history; for example, using the same Soviet allegations against the 1940s nationalist movement that they were "Nazis."

In contrast to all other Ukrainian presidents, who sought to strike a neutral balance between rival Orthodox Churches, Yanukovych has openly aligned himself with the UOC-MP. Symbolically, he received blessing in Kyiv from Russian Patriarch Kiril *before* he went to his inauguration in the Ukrainian parliament.

Parliamentary deputies from the Party of Regions submitted a draft law on languages in summer 2010 which would have upgraded Russian to the status of a 'regional language' throughout most of Ukrain-

¹⁵Parliaments of more than 20 countries, including the USA, Canada, Spain, Poland, Hungary, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Baltic states and elsewhere have recognized the *holodomor* as a genocide.

ian territory. This would be a further blow to the Ukrainian language—as stated in the recommendations of the OSCE and the letter of OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Knut Vollebaek to Ukrainian Parliamentary Chairman Lytvyn.¹⁶

It seems that President Yanukovich made concessions on issues that are symbolically important to Russia but do not threaten his power. While playing on contradictions between different regions, the Yanukovich administration is seeking a monopolization of power over *all of* Ukraine and therefore would try to avoid threats of separatism or raising the issue of federalization. For example, Yanukovich's concessions to Russia on the Sevastopol naval base do not benefit local Crimean elites. Although Crimea's Prime Minister Vasyl Jarty is formally subordinated to the Crimean Parliament he and his entourage come from the town of Makeevka in the Donetsk region and *de facto* control the Crimean peninsula.

Many analysts have concluded that the Party of Regions is tacitly supporting the nationalist Svoboda (Freedom) party. In the October 2010 local elections Svoboda won in the three *oblasts* of Galicia. Their success coincided with the plans of the Party of Regions to destroy Tymoshenko and other radical opposition forces thereby opening up political space into which controlled, loyal nationalists such as Svoboda could be interjected.¹⁷

Conclusions and Recommendations

National integration, on the one hand, and democratic and market reforms, on the other, reinforce one other. National integration permits the introduction of painful reforms which are difficult to introduce in divided societies. At the same time, if reforms are successful, they provide the basis for national cohesion on other issues.

¹⁶These documents were released in www.RFE/RL.org, January 14, 2011. See <http://docs.rferl.org/uk-UA/2011/01/14/original.pdf>.

¹⁷See, for example, Mykola Pysarchuk and Olena Mihachova, "Partia 'Svoboda'—viddushyna dlia znevirenykh chy tekhnologia bahatorazovoho vykorystannia," *UNIАН*, January 20, 2011.

Despite the fact that the goal of European integration is not viewed by the majority of Ukrainians as a vehicle which could become a 'national idea,' the development of relations with the EU and integration into the EU is viewed positively in all regions of the country. Therefore, it is important that the average man and woman in the street, especially in the east and south of the country, would see benefits from these relations in the form of a visa-free regime, possibilities for younger Ukrainians to study abroad, the growth of cultural, educational, and professional exchanges, and learning from the European experience in providing local and regional self-government. The establishment of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement could provide additional 'carrots' for Ukrainian entrepreneurs to reform themselves and become more transparent in their business practices.

Information campaigns on NATO should highlight how NATO provides practical help to Ukraine in emergency situations, cybersecurity, security to the Euro-2012 football championship, orders for Ukrainian industry, and support for the training of Ukrainian officers. NATO was for post-communist countries the stepping stone from which they joined the EU.

Legal changes at the national level should stimulate cooperation between regions and provide a framework for this endeavor. Constitutional reform should not be viewed as a zero-sum game and any reforms and establishment of a political system should have as an important objective the prevention of the monopolization of power. Instead of vacuous rhetoric about federalization, there should be real reform of local self-government which decreases the dependence of regions upon an all-powerful 'center.' Despite popular support for a return to a majoritarian electoral system (because it allegedly provides for a 'connection' between deputies, his district and voters), most analysts agree that the best way to support party development is to introduce open and regional party slates.

An Open Ukraine keen to introduce the radical reforms outlined in other chapters requires national integration and the overcoming of regional tensions that have become exasperated under Yushchenko and Yanukovych. It means that Ukraine should find a balance between support for the Ukrainian language and culture with respect for the

rights of ethnic minorities. At the same time, the latter is impossible if Ukrainians continue to feel their culture and language is being subjected to discrimination. Therefore, the Ukrainian authorities should avoid policies that polarize the country, avoid the appointment of officials who are considered to be offensive to the majority of the Ukrainian population.

It is important to increase the role of civil society, for example, to involve competent experts in debating key appointments in the education sphere and in developing modern Ukrainian history textbooks. These textbooks should not be limited to the history of ethnic Ukrainians but be based on the standard Western frameworks of territorial, inclusive histories.

An Open Ukraine requires policies to develop modern Ukrainian culture, including popular culture. The biggest challenge for Ukrainian nation-building is to promote Ukrainian-language publications in the media, on talk shows, during popular performances, and through computer games. For example, it is important to keep a 50% quota on the radio for Ukrainian-language performances, in music and authors, and to develop clear criteria for what it means to support 'Ukrainian-language products.'¹⁸

For Western policymakers it is important to understand why the issue of keeping Ukrainian as the only state language is so sensitive to Ukrainians, why double citizenship is unacceptable and why they urge Russia, Hungary and Romania to respect Ukrainian laws regarding this issue. In general, Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation could serve as a model for relations between Ukraine and its neighbors.

In the sphere of inter-ethnic and inter-regional relations, an Open Ukraine requires policies that could be drawn from formulations drawn up by the Razumkov Center. These include:

- popularization of works by outstanding Ukrainian and foreign writers who advocated inter-ethnic tolerance and their inclusion in secondary school programs in literature;

¹⁸See the recommendations of the NGO expert consortium Ihor Burakovsky ed., *Nova vlada: vyklyky modernizatsii* (Kyiv: KISS, 2011), pp. 216-218.

- creation of a network of courses on the Ukrainian language for the adult population in Russian-speaking regions, including for specific target audiences such as civil servants, representatives of the judiciary and security forces;
- introduction of knowledge tests for civil servants of the state language and the language of communication of the overwhelming majority of local residents;
- inclusion of obligatory excursions, including to other regions, into school programs;
- implementation of a comprehensive national information campaign publicizing Ukraine's history and culture, the Ukrainian language, state symbols, and achievements of the country in different domains;
- familiarization of Ukrainian society (first of all, youth) with the history, culture, spiritual and household traditions of ethnic minorities;
- encouragement of inter-regional migration of youth to enter higher education;
- prevention of 'enclavization' of higher education due to the "approach to places of residence."¹⁹

Strong Western support remains important for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, in general, and for stabilization in the Crimea, in particular. To resolve the problems of deported ethnic groups, and first of all Crimean Tatars, it is important to adopt a law on the rights of these groups and in the socio-economic area to conduct an inventory of the land in the Crimea. The authorities should not attempt to split the Crimean Tatars and undermine the authority of the Mejlis; on the contrary, the role of consultative bodies of Crimean Tatars is to be increased. More Crimean Tatar youth should be provided with possibilities to study outside the Crimea, including abroad.

¹⁹See Common identity of the citizens of Ukraine, National Security and Defence, no. 9, 2007, pp. 28-31. Available at www.uceps.org/eng/files/category_journal/NSD93_eng.pdf.

A difficult question is how to make Sevastopol survive economically without a Russian naval base? This is part of a more general question of how to create a favorable investment climate in the Crimea, especially in tourism.

No preferences should be given to any religious confession. The question of the unity of divided Orthodox churches should be left to their own competence as the Ukrainian state can only support dialogue between them. The Ukrainian authorities should not be permitted to get away State Channel 1 devoting too much time to visits and statements by the Moscow patriarch: religious activity should be covered in media without its politicization. The role of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and religious organization should be increased, and draft laws regarding religious issues should be passed to the Ukrainian parliament *after* consultations with the council.

