

Hello Goodbye

January 23, 2020

To: Governor Gifford

From: Your National Security Adviser

Subject: Charting a New Foreign Policy for the 2020 Campaign

The President has staked his Presidency on a reticent America. While that posture fit the national mood in 2016, when the Great Crash forced the country to retrench and resulted in his surprise election, America is in need of the new vision you can provide for the country. Your other campaign memos have focused on domestic policy. This memo reviews the dramatic changes in U.S. foreign policy in recent years and recommends a course of action for you to win the foreign policy debate and ultimately the Presidency.

America's dramatic retrenchment over the past four years resulted not from overstretch overseas but from fiscal, economic and political problems at home. While wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and North Africa certainly helped to dilute the U.S. position in the world, in the end the country's failure to tackle its own domestic challenges proved decisive.

A decade ago, America was burdened by a historically unprecedented and ultimately unsustainable national debt; high, persistent unemployment; creaking infrastructure; and declining competitiveness—all exacerbated by polarized politics that blocked the country from tackling any of these challenges effectively. If the situation had been allowed to continue, America's federal, state and local debt to GDP rate today would have been more than 120 percent. We would have become Greece.

But we never reached that point. When debt hit 100 percent of GDP at the end of 2015, confidence in Washington's ability to control its debt evaporated, triggering a dollar crisis in global financial markets. China's announcement that it was cutting back its dollar holdings imposed tremendous pressure on the dollar. The Fed was forced to raise interest rates sharply and President Obama had to revoke his own budget in his last year in office. U.S. authority and influence were badly tarnished, and the appeal of the American model of market-based capitalism was considerably weakened.

Obama's successor rode into office on a wave of anger at profligate government and the country's dependence on foreign entanglements. The old center of American politics vanished as chastened Democrats pledged to narrow their focus on those most hurt by the crisis and the Republican party all but collapsed into the Tea Party, its leaders vowing to take a hatchet to the federal budget. It was an ugly and punitive time. No category of federal spending was spared, including entitlements and defense. Each side realized that they had to compromise on some fundamental points. Deficits were cut sharply through a combination of big spending cuts, tax increases and re-imposed budget rules. Despite their very different starting points, both political camps rallied to a new consensus centered on a far more circumspect and reticent America. In short, America's diminished role was not due to the rise of other powers or external threats; it was a conscious decision by the American people.

Americans have not lost their sense of exceptionalism. But in the 2016 election the American people made it clear that they believed the best way to restore U.S. vigor and strength was to focus on problems at home, not engage in adventures abroad. In this sense the new national mood is more evocative of America's Jeffersonian tradition, which has always prioritized building a model society that others might emulate, rather than the Wilsonian notion that the U.S. has both a moral duty and a practical need to spread democracy to the ends of the earth. America's "new normal" consensus is that U.S. attempts to foster regime change abroad have on balance weakened American security, cast whole regions of the world into upheaval, and created whirlpools of instability from which undreamed-of threats later arise. The President himself is a reborn Jeffersonian who never tires of saying that his job is not to spread democracy abroad but to safeguard it at home. He likes to evoke Jefferson's admonishment to make America "a standing monument for the aim and imitation by other countries." He has been effective in capitalizing on the widespread belief that the 20th century legacy of protecting Europe and Asia had become outdated and only left America weaker and less competitive.

What has given the President's message real force, however, has been the Jacksonian storm that swept both houses of Congress. The Jacksonian majority in the House is characterized by antiestablishment populism, strong aversion to government debt, cuts to any

defense programs not clearly focused on the American homeland; skepticism that free trade with low-wage countries benefits Americans; and rejection of the scientific consensus on climate change. These tenets are all energized by a firm belief in America's "manifest destiny" yet fueled by deep skepticism about America's ability to create a liberal world order. Born-again Jacksonians believe that the U.S. government should focus like a laser beam on the physical security and narrow economic self-interests of the American people. They are unlikely to support any U.S. military intervention in the name of human rights or any limited aims other than retribution for an attack on the United States. They are prepared to do whatever it takes to defend the country, but they do not believe that U.S. interests are best served by a liberal world order.

This historically unusual amalgam of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian traditions is reflected in the rather solid popular consensus that such global phenomena as outsourcing and offshoring have not only destroyed the viability of low-skill, high-wage manufacturing jobs, but have also displaced many high-skill service activities as well. As a result of this convergence of views, American political leaders are inclined to resist any "entangling" institutional commitments and obligations, and the U.S. Senate is unlikely to ratify any of the pending treaties gathering dust in its subcommittee chambers. The country has turned against the easy rhetoric of free trade and the benefits of international engagement. Popular support for an expansive foreign policy has shriveled; there is little to no support for expensive state-building interventions leading to state-building exercises, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nor is there any support for the kind of humanitarian interventions to rescue people under assault from their own governments that we've seen over the past decade, like Syria, Yemen, or Libya.

This new national consensus gave the President a clear mandate in his first term to reduce America's footprint abroad and to focus, in his words, on "restoring America's promise at home." With support in the Congress, he is engaged in a massive burden-shedding exercise—shedding the burden of defending countries able to defend themselves, abandoning efforts to fix failed states, and focusing on those security challenges that he believes pose the greatest threat to America. Defense spending has been cut dramatically, and the current

BRAC exercise is slated to recommend the complete elimination of the U.S. forward presence in Europe, Japan, and the Middle East, with only a small force in the Strait of Hormuz and a token presence in South Korea.

If the President is re-elected, the changes are likely to be even more dramatic. The President's goal is to transform America's security posture from one premised on forward presence to one based on offshore balancing. His key argument is that the most vital U.S. interests are to prevent an attack on the American homeland; to prevent the emergence of any dominant power in Eurasia; and to forestall the emergence of a regional ("oil") hegemon in the Middle East. The U.S. should not become embroiled in the conflicts of other regions, but should instead promote regional balances of power to thwart any states with hegemonic aspirations. The President has argued that such a strategic shift will not only reduce conflict and make the U.S. safer, it will allow him to reshape the U.S. military to suit this more modest set of objectives, at a price that American taxpayers can swallow. This is the rationale behind his interest in withdrawing U.S. ground forces from Europe and Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assuming an over-the-horizon military posture. He has stated repeatedly that the U.S. should reinsert troops into Eurasia only if regional power balances crumbled.

He has matched these efforts by picking up the pace on nuclear disarmament and really starting to zero. He has ordered unilateral reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal that do not depend on Russia or on the Congress, going even beyond the provisions of the 2017 START Reduction Treaty—which is languishing in the Senate—to cut the active U.S. arsenal to 800 weapons and removing all remaining U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe.

The sole area where the President has boosted spending is in homeland security, to protect American soil from terrorist attacks and nuclear threats. His ambitious proposals to create "America's Shield" has invited great criticism from other countries and generated considerable controversy within his own party. But he is determined to shift the historic calculus governing America's deterrence strategy from offense to defense.

The President has been effective in arguing that his policy accommodates the rise of emerging powers; shifts the responsibility of defending Euro-Asian powers onto themselves; is unlikely to embroil the U.S. in other countries' disputes; and is thus both more efficient and effective in defending vital American interests than those wedded to the past. His strategy seeks to turn the emergence of other powers to U.S. advantage. It relies on a balance among many states to maintain U.S. security. All the other great powers are in neighborhoods populated by other would-be powers or dangerous regional foes. In contrast to a world of forward-deployed U.S. forces, which he believes only served to embroil America in others' disputes and made the U.S. a magnet for others' resentments, he believes that his approach to a multipolar world has deflected others' attention toward threats nearer to home, and that self-imposed U.S. restraints have further negated others' incentives to balance against American power. His approach is based on burden shifting, not burden sharing. It has transformed the U.S. from a regional stabilizer into a balancer of last resort by passing to others the primary responsibility for maintaining regional power balances and stabilizing Europe, East Asia and the Middle East. He argues that encouraging other countries to provide more for their own security, rather than relying on the United States, is a fundamental U.S. interest. Rather than identifying himself with Harry Truman's admonition that "the buck stops here," he has essentially passed the buck to other powers to take on the burdens of pacifying their regions, because their security and economic interests are greater. Better them than us, he always says.

The President believes that America is not in the business of solving other peoples' problems, and can afford to be a bystander in the opening stages of regional conflicts. In most cases, he argues, regional powers will be able to deal with trouble-making neighbors. And in the few instances where they cannot, the U.S., as offshore balancer, can always step in to defeat an aggressor.

Global Impact

The President's approach, supported by the Jacksonian-Jeffersonian majority in the Congress, has enjoyed some reasonable popular support. Faced with an overstretched military, massive government debt, popular disenchantment with foreign wars, and mounting challenges

at home, Americans have indeed lost their appetite for fixing other people's problems.

Yet America's new stance has had various repercussions overseas. Allies who had alternately relied on and recoiled from U.S. global leadership are finding it hard to adjust to America's retrenchment. The current drawdown and likely full withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Europe has unnerved governments across the continent. Europeans were particularly surprised when the U.S. failed to join them to address the renewed violence in the Balkans. NATO's 70th anniversary summit was more funeral than birthday. The message the allies took away from that disaster is that Europe cannot rely on the United States. The effect has been to galvanize European cooperation in some ways, while adding to Europe's internal disagreements in others. Moreover, some of our relationships, even among some former close allies, have become more selective and situational, so that it has become harder to classify European countries as either allies or adversaries; they cooperate on some issues and resist on others.

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have also been confused by U.S. retrenchment from its high-profile position in the Asia-Pacific region. They do not want to trade traditional U.S. security support for any collective regional security arrangement. Nonetheless, American reticence and new Asian dynamics point to more intra-Asian, and less Asian-American cooperation. The Administration's neglect of Taiwan, coupled with the continued rise of Chinese military power, means that the U.S. is no longer able to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack, a reality that could be tested in the near future.

Even as our traditional bonds with Europe and Japan have weakened, many countries have been attracted by China's alternative development model. Moreover, China is increasingly becoming the epicenter of an increasingly interlinked Asian hemisphere. In fact, greater Asian integration oriented around China is slowly filling the vacuum left by the weakening multilateral order, further undermining that order in the process. The creation of an Asian basket of currencies was perhaps the most visible recent effort by Asians to insulate themselves from financial contagion from volatile Western financial markets; reduce their overreliance on the United States; and facilitate regional economic integration.

Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China's and India's development of blue-water naval capabilities. India and China can now project naval power to European shores far more easily than European powers can project power to the Pacific. The buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes.

Advances by others in science and technology, expanded adoption of irregular warfare tactics by both state and non-state actors, proliferation of long-range precision weapons, and growing use of cyber warfare tactics will increasingly constrict U.S. freedom of action. The multiplicity of influential actors and distrust of vast power means less room for the U.S. to call the shots without the support of strong partnerships.

These trends, of course, are uneven—although China and India compete, they are also rising together. The invention of the next generation of Internet by a joint Chinese-Indian team of scientists should prod us to understand the need to make equally important connections. Early and significant adoption of these technologies is already providing considerable economic advantage to those countries.

Perhaps the greatest impact of a more reticent America, however, has been in the Middle East. Lacking consensus behind a military solution to Iranian development of nuclear-weapons capability, and now faced with a nuclear Iran, the United States declared that it could live with a nuclear-armed Iran—just as it did with China in the 1960s, when China was seen as far more dangerous a rogue state than Iran was at the time. The President has declared that while a nuclear-armed Iran hardly is desirable, neither is it “intolerable,” because it can be contained and deterred successfully by the United States. His explicit extension of the U.S. deterrence umbrella to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, together with Iran's dual declaration that it would not attack Israel and not supply such weapons to terrorists, have dampened the possibility of a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Nonetheless, politically the President has distanced himself from Israel, where—as elsewhere in the region—there is consternation about his assertion that America's new deterrence strategy for the

Middle East did not require an on-the-ground American military presence in the region, and that offshore U.S. air and naval power would provide sufficient deterrent power. Regional fears about a nuclear armed Iran could still trigger an arms race and greater militarization. States in the region worried about Iran and feeling abandoned by the U.S. are developing new security arrangements with external powers, acquiring additional weapons, and some are pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. Episodes of low-intensity conflict taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.

America's diminished presence in the Middle East has only accelerated deeper economic ties between that region and Asia. Some two-thirds of Mideast oil exports go to Asia, and some 70 percent of Asian imports are from the Middle East. This pattern is likely to intensify. The U.S. unwillingness to maintain open seas has prompted concern over oil supply routes and is now leading to a China-India naval arms race. Japan, alarmed at the prospect of its oil supplies being disrupted, is engaged in a furious domestic debate about whether to revitalize its naval projection power.

The President's offshore balancing strategy means that the United States has abandoned any pretense of promoting democratic transformation in the Middle East. Faced with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and confronted tribal conflicts resulting in a radical Libyan regime following Gaddafi's ouster, the United States simply opted out, arguing that it could not successfully pick and chose winners in the region's politics, and decided to avoid the double risk of becoming entrapped in potential domestic upheavals and thereby giving additional stimulus to radical Islamic terrorists who want to target the United States.

All told, this Administration's foreign policy is hastening the emergence of an apolar world, as other states rise, globalization quickens, and non-state actors play increasingly influential roles. The relatively predictable relationships and structures of the past have given way to fluid patterns of simultaneous cooperation and competition among the major powers—the U.S., China, the still-fitful EU, Russia, India and Brazil—as each seeks to obtain the best economic and political

advantage for itself while cooperating on issues of common concern. A whole other tier of emerging powers—from Turkey and South Africa to Indonesia and Egypt—are gaming the system, asserting their voice without necessarily buying into international rules or norms of behavior. This pattern is producing unexpected accommodations and temporary alliances. It has generated tensions and made it far harder to build collective responses and to make institutions work. The Brasilia Round of global trade talks—following on the heels of the Doha Round’s failure—itself proved to be stillborn, as other countries have followed the U.S. call to “take care of their own.”

As a result, U.S. influence is not what it once was. Both Beijing and Moscow diluted international efforts to pressure the government in Nigeria to end its tragic conflict. The joint EU-Chinese peacekeeping operation in Africa foundered. Resource nationalism has reappeared as countries scramble to secure supplies of raw materials, food, water and energy.

This is not a world conducive to American interests. Apolarity has increased the number and nature of threats and vulnerabilities facing the United States. These threats can take the form of rogue states, terrorist groups, energy producers that choose to reduce their output, or central banks whose action or inaction can create conditions that affect the role and strength of the U.S. dollar.

Your challenge in the coming campaign will be to convince the American people that a world without America is a dangerous world for Americans. The government may be broke, but America is not poor. To advance American interests and values, the United States must reinvest and reengage. It is time to embark on a new course.

Winning Back the Presidency—and America

For the moment, the traditional internationalist alliance between those who believe that open commerce and an activist U.S. political and military presence are the best means to ensure American prosperity and security is on the defensive. America’s Wilsonian impulse—the notion that the United States has both a moral obligation and an important national interest in spreading American democratic and social values throughout the world, creating a peaceful international community that accepts the rule of law— has been muted.

But the President was wounded in his own party's early primaries by Senator Cartwright's charge that his extreme policies had sacrificed our allies and our interests. Similarly, your initial statements challenging your primary opponents, most of whom still cling to the rhetoric of retrenchment, have resonated with an activist core of supporters. If you are to win the foreign policy debate and with it not only our party's nomination but the election, your challenge will be to unite this internationalist core, which straddles both parties as well as independent voters.

The President's improbable election was due to a unique moment in American political life when economic crisis coincided with a surge of populist political energy and a significant loss of popular confidence in establishment institutions, ranging from mainstream media and the foreign policy and defense and intellectual establishments to the financial and corporate leadership and the government itself. The failure of political leaders of the time to break out of their petty bickering and to tackle the mounting pressures on America's position at home and abroad unleashed a populist backlash of striking proportions. Yet this constellation is uneasy, unsustainable, and vulnerable to change.

You should have no illusions—your call for a revival of America's internationalist impulse will be difficult. If done right, however, your message could resonate with the forgotten mainstream. In retrospect these past four years have perhaps been an inevitable corrective, a necessary interlude, a painful *intermezzo* of realigning ends and means. But the President has made mistakes, the country is on the rebound, and there is a growing realization—which you can capture—that America cannot simply retreat from the world. Voters are turning away from the President's message of sullen retrenchment and are receptive to a new message of progress. This is your opportunity.

Your opponent's call to "take care of our own" is resonant in America today. Indeed, the need for domestic renewal is self-evident. But how do we "take care of our own" in a world where it takes seconds to transfer wealth, minutes to flash news, or hours to transmit diseases from one continent to another? An apolar world of disparate itinerant and diffident powers will not help us cope with new diseases, civilian disasters, conflicts over resources or the breakdown of world trade. America's domestic renewal requires America's active engagement

abroad. The affairs of the world have become too deeply integrated into the fabric of our lives for us simply to ignore the rest of the globe while we concentrate on our domestic priorities. Foreign policy must be founded on a renewal of our domestic strength; yet we cannot rebuild our domestic strength in opposition to an active foreign policy.

America cannot sustain an effective foreign policy unless the American people are confident that our actions abroad serve our interests at home. America still has greater capacity over more dimensions of power than any other country, and traditionally has been better connected to all other countries than they have been to each other. The problem is that in our decade of retrenchment we have allowed all of this to atrophy. We have cut ourselves off from a critical source of American strength—the openness of our country and our people. You have the opportunity to challenge the prevailing consensus and to build a new domestic coalition to reestablish American vigor at home and abroad.

You must be clear that the need for constructive engagement is not a call for a new unilateralism. It is an effort to reconcile our domestic needs with our international challenges. What is required is a fusion of our values and our interests. As the next American President, you have the opportunity to break the cycle of expansive idealism alternating with narrow self-interest—both, at heart, forms of unilateralism. It is time to build a consensus on new priorities.

Today's apolar world is an increasingly difficult and dangerous one for America. That is why you have a chance to change the terms of debate—to emerge from our decade of retrenchment to encourage a greater degree of global integration, establish a core group of governments and others committed to cooperative multilateralism to help manage apolarity and increase the odds that the international system will not deteriorate or disintegrate. To win the Presidency, you must tackle this mood head-on and energize a new coalition of internationalists; free-trade pragmatists; and value-centered voters.

You must make the case that there is no substitute for American leadership, but in an era of lowered expectations and resources such leadership must be of a different kind. There will be a premium on consultation and coalition building and on a diplomacy that encourages cooperation when possible and shields such cooperation from the fallout of inevitable disagreements.

There are positives upon which to build. Anti-Americanism has diminished, and no Great Power rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the United States. Yet overall the situation is troubling. Your platform should focus on one clear message: the United States can and must take steps to reduce the chances that an apolar world will become a cauldron of instability.

A key point of attack is that there is little evidence that others are willing to share U.S. global burdens. Washington has pulled back, but others have not come forward to share the burden, they have moved into spaces created by U.S. absence to extract as much advantage as they can for themselves. China's rush to lock down reliable long-term access to natural resources has led Beijing to aggressively buy commodities in Africa, Latin America and other emerging markets. Your challenge that the President was "asleep at the switch" when Russia forcefully re-annexed Georgia was a bright moment of challenge that forced many to reconsider their approach, even though in the end it failed to either stop Russia's actions or to swing the national mood. Europe's failure to step into the breach, however, affirms your argument that even though the U.S. has stepped back others have not stepped forward. The result is a more disorderly and less prosperous world.

In fact, you can make a strong case that the rising powers are simply not ready or willing to stand up for a vast set of principles—the collective defense of democracy, nuclear nonproliferation, trade liberalization, international criminal justice, environmental protection, respect for human rights—that have been enshrined in many international and regional treaties and agreements and that are essential to America's own security, prosperity and democracy. Constructing this web of international norms was the mission of two generations of American leaders, supported by the American people. It was slow and painful work over decades, and now it is unraveling. The "new" powers are still wedded to old principles—sovereignty, self-determination, non-intervention, and autonomous economic development. They are not ready to abandon their traditional stance favoring nonintervention over the collective defense of human rights and democracy.... Trying to gain greater status without a road map, they fall back on their default option: the rhetoric and posturing of bygone days, invoking national sovereignty and nonintervention, calling for limited interna-

tional jurisdiction, and defending the application of different standards to different nations. Unfortunately, this mood is resonant within America as well. Whereas many Americans and Europeans especially over the last half a century championed cosmopolitan norms of individual rights over collective rights of state sovereignty, actors such as China, Russia and India continue to jealously guard the norms of self-determination, autonomy and sovereignty.

The U.S. did continue one key element of its previous policy framework: it has resisted the further spread of nuclear weapons and unguarded nuclear materials. Given their destructive potential, this effort remains extremely important. But as part of our retrenchment we have shied away from any additional security assurances and defensive systems that could be provided to states which might otherwise feel compelled to develop nuclear programs of their own to counter those of their neighbors. And we have abandoned our ability to work with other key countries to impose robust sanctions—on occasion backed by armed force—to influence the behavior of would-be nuclear states.

In short, you can make a good case that our retrenchment from the world's affairs only hurts us more. Ten years ago, the basic complaint was about the U.S. having too much power; today the even worse—perhaps far worse—challenge is that the U.S. has too little of it.

The way forward is not to propose sweeping adjustments to questions of global governance, but to use U.S. power and its connections to other powers to forge limited coalitions for specific ends. The U.S. should actively form issue-specific major power groupings, most of which will be steered by Washington, that seek to reach informal bargains that can shape broader agreements in more formal mechanisms such as the IMF, NPT or the UN. The Major Economies Forum developed this way, and did the Nuclear Security Group. Such efforts are a relatively effective and efficient mechanism through which to advance U.S. interests and structure relations with other key powers in an apolar world. This is the age of unilateralism.

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- p. 43, ... *time to build a consensus on new priorities* ... *Changing Our Ways*, op. cit.
- p. 43, ... *diplomacy that encourages cooperation when possible and shields such cooperation from the fallout of inevitable disagreements* ... Hulsman and Korteweg phrase it in this way: “The only question (and it is a seminal one) that remains: Is the United States prepared to pare back its foreign policy ambitions to meet this new financial reality, or will it prove another classic victim of Imperial Overstretch, trying to do everything it once did, while now being forced to live on a budget?” Hulsman & Korteweg, op. cit.
- p. 44, ... *the rising powers are simply not ready or willing to stand up for a vast set of principles* ... Jorge Castañeda, “Not Ready for Prime Time,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2010; Jorge Castañeda, “The Trouble with the BRICs,” *Foreign Policy*, March 14, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/14/the_trouble_with_the_brics; Stewart Patrick, “Irresponsible Stakeholders? The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers,” *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2010; Jonathan Holslag, “Europe’s normative disconnect with the emerging powers,” *Asia Paper*, Vol. 5, No. 4. Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies.
- p. 45, ... *this effort remains extremely important* ... See George Perkovich, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: Why the United States Should Lead,” *Policy Brief* No. 66, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2008; George Perkovich, “Principles for Reforming the Nuclear Order,” Ifri Security Studies Center Proliferation Paper, Fall 2008; “The growing appeal of zero,” *The Economist*, June 16, 2011; William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, eds., *Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century*, 2 vols. (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2011); Michael E. Brown, et. al, eds., *Going Nuclear: Nuclear Proliferation and International Security in the 21st Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard/MIT, 2010).
- p. 45, ... *our retrenchment from the world’s affairs only hurts us more* ... See Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, *That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind in the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2011); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a Cash-Strapped Era* (New York: Public Affairs, 2010).
- p. 45, ... *forge limited coalitions for specific ends* ... For a discussion of ‘minilateralism’ vs. ‘multilateralism,’ see Moises Naim, “Minilateralism: The magic number to get real international action,” *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2009, and various responses summarized by Chris Borgen, “Debating “Minilateralism,” <http://opiniojuris.org/2009/06/28/debating-minilateralism/>.