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Thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and all the distinguished Senators here today for the opportunity to testify about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As you know, I served as the 19th U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, from August 2008 to May 2009. I remain extremely grateful to the members of this Committee for supporting my nomination to that position in 2008.

That posting came at the end of a career spanning over 20 years in government in which I worked on NATO issues from a number of different perspectives during the course of five U.S. Administrations:

- as a desk officer for NATO issues in the State Department,
- as a political-military officer in Budapest when it was aspiring to join NATO,
- here in the Senate as a Legislative Fellow during the year of the Senate's ratification of the first modern round of NATO enlargement,
- as Deputy Director of the NATO Secretary General's Private Office,
- as a senior official in both the National Security Council and the State Department
- and finally as U.S. Ambassador.

In these various capacities, I had the opportunity to contribute to NATO's 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, NATO enlargement, NATO's partnerships, NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and elsewhere, the 50th and 60th Anniversary Summits, and

countless Ministerial and Summit meetings. It has been a unique privilege to serve both my country and the greatest Alliance in history in so many ways and I am thankful for the opportunity.

During these two decades, I have seen NATO transform dramatically: from a Cold War alliance focused on deterrence and preparing for the defense of Europe against the Soviet Union, to a much larger, outward looking Alliance – one that is engaged in civil-military operations, and aimed at tackling a new range of security threats, together with many partners, in places around the globe.

Despite this remarkable transformation, I am deeply concerned about the state of our Alliance today. NATO is in trouble. It faces significant challenges from both outside and within.

A New Transatlantic Compact

In my view, we need a renewed political compact on security between Europe and North America. The firm establishment of the past is fading. The establishment of a new compact, at a political level, should be the central task of the ongoing effort to produce a new NATO Strategic Concept.

Such a compact would not change U.S. or any other Allies' obligations under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Rather, it would constitute a fresh, common understanding of what those obligations are in today's vastly changed security environment.

At its heart is the idea that the United States remains committed to Europe itself – a reliable ally that will share decision-making and do its part to guarantee a strong, secure, democratic Europe. And Europe, in turn, must be prepared to put its full weight behind joining the United States in tackling the global security challenges that affect us all.

Such a political compact needs to encompass:

- a coherent transatlantic approach to dealing with Russia;
- a common commitment to facing new threats and challenges both inside and outside of Europe;
- a renewed commitment that our shared goal remains a Europe whole, free, and at peace; and
- a commitment that each of us will put the full measure of our human and financial resources behind making NATO's work a success.

Fundamentals of the Transatlantic Relationship

Before discussing in greater detail these current challenges to NATO and ways to address them, let me stress some fundamentals.

First, as clearly stated in its founding document, the Washington Treaty, NATO has always been about values. Having an organization that serves as a means of pulling the transatlantic community together, to produce joint action in support of shared democratic values, remains essential today.

After defeating fascism and faced with expansionist Soviet communism, the transatlantic community established NATO out of the recognition that the universal human values that underpin our societies – freedom, market economy, democracy, human rights and the rule of law – remained under threat and had to be actively defended.

We recognized that the democracies of Europe and North America – though by no means having a monopoly on values – nonetheless had a special place in defining, sustaining, protecting and promoting these values for ourselves, and in the world. This “values foundation” remains at the heart of NATO today.

Over the years, we have seen that we cannot be indifferent when these fundamental values are under threat – whether within Europe or in other parts of the world – even if the threat to our own societies may seem less immediate. Our democracies are safest in a world where democratic values are in ascendance, and at ever greater risk when they are in retreat.

Second, NATO’s purpose was never about perpetuating itself, or assuring its own “relevance.” Rather, it has always been about helping people to live in freedom, safety, and growing prosperity – first by defending the West, and then, when possible, by being open to new members from the East and South joining this values-based community.

In other words, NATO underpinned the growth toward a Europe whole, free and at peace. This work is far from over, and indeed we have seen regression in recent years. We need to get back on track.

The 15 years that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall marked a period of remarkable construction and progress in this historic mission. NATO grew from 16 countries in 1989 to 28 today. Likewise, the EU grew from 12 to 26 members. Today, over 100 million people now live in free societies that are more prosperous and fundamentally secure, compared to the divided Europe of pre-1989.

Yet the work of creating a Europe whole, free and at peace is far from complete. Indeed, we have seen a rise in authoritarianism, and curtailments of freedom and justice in Russia and some other states of the former Soviet Union. We have seen flare-ups of nationalism and ethnic rivalry in the Balkans and even Central and Eastern Europe. Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and others of Europe’s neighbors need to continue their development – and thus far, they remain outside of NATO and the EU.

Some argue that further growth of this democratic community is a “threat” to Russian interests. I firmly disagree: the growth of freedom, prosperity and security in Europe is

a threat to no one. There is no “zero-sum” between the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole, and Russian interests – we are part of a common space. Indeed, Russia should be a vital part of this democratic community in Europe – but to do so, Russia must live up to the same democratic, good-neighborly standards as the rest of us.

Acceding to the logic that the growth of a democratic space in Eurasia is a “threat” to Russia would subordinate the interests of the millions of people living in states near Russia to the wishes of an increasingly non-democratic Russian leadership.

It is essential that the transatlantic community renew momentum toward the creation of a Europe that is truly whole, free and at peace, anchored on democratic values, for the benefit of all of its citizens, whether in the East, West, North or South. NATO remains vital to the realization of this vision.

Third, since the end of the Cold War, there have emerged serious new threats to the security of the Allies. Indeed, there is a greater diversity of threats – in terms of both geography and nature of challenge – than at anytime in the past.

Washington, London, Madrid and Istanbul have all been subject to terrorist attacks linked to an ideology of violent extremism, and inspired from territories outside of Europe. Failed or weak states create havens for terrorism, crime, and proliferation. Our information societies are at risk from cyber-attacks, and our developed economies can be at risk from energy shut-offs. All of these are examples of threats that can come, as one of my predecessors, Nick Burns, used to say, from “the dark side of globalization.”

But we must remember that state-level threats have not entirely disappeared. We see Iran developing missiles and nuclear technology. Last year, in Georgia, we saw Russia abuse its position as a peacekeeper to invade Georgia and break off Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgian territory by military force. This comes on top of Russia shutting off gas supplies to Ukraine, affecting NATO-ally Bulgaria, and suspicions of Russian involvement in cyber-attacks against Estonia.

Fourth, it is essential that the United States and Europe work together to deal with our common challenges. The temptation for the U.S. to decide things on its own, or to assemble a coalition of willing states – or alternatively, the temptation that Europe should act on its own, or act as a counter-weight to the United States – is a chimera.

The United States and Europe share the same fundamental, democratic values; we face the same challenges in the world; and we can only deal with these challenges effectively if we deal with them together. It is hard work, but necessary.

This is true in practice as much as it sounds good in theory: whether it is Afghanistan, or non-proliferation, or counter-terrorism, or anti-piracy, or dealing with a more assertive Russia, we are in fact working together everyday. We are most successful when we have the most coherent and committed transatlantic set of policies – and least successful when we don't.

That is why having a strong Europe, and a strong EU, is fundamentally in America's interest. And also why being a "good European" must include also being a "good Atlanticist."

And fifth among these fundamentals, permit me this observation: In contrast to a number of other foreign policy issues, NATO has always enjoyed bipartisan support and commitment in the United States. I believe this has contributed to the success and strength of NATO over the years, and I believe all of us must do whatever we can to continue this bipartisan support for NATO.

These foundation stones – values, a Europe whole and free, facing real threats in the world today, genuine transatlantic partnership, and bipartisan U.S. commitment – are all essential. Let us not forget them.

NATO's Transformation Thus Far

In building on these foundation stones, NATO has already adapted to the 21st century world in a four principal ways:

- By enlarging, in three waves thus far;
- By creating partnerships – the Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue, the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine, the Istanbul Initiative, the growth of partnership with friends around the globe, and the NATO-Georgia Commission
- By becoming operational – from zero operations before 1995 to Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Active Endeavor, airlift to Darfur, and humanitarian relief;
- By moving away from large, heavy militaries to smaller, lighter, more expeditionary forces.

Each of these aspects of transformation has been vital to NATO carrying out its founding mission of collective defense, but in a vastly different security environment.

Serious Challenges Facing NATO Today – and the Role of the Strategic Concept

Yet as NATO has transformed, the consensus within the transatlantic community about NATO's roles and its future has weakened. Despite its successful transformation, we now find ourselves with a NATO that is at serious risk.

Allies disagree on such key issues as:

- the importance of Afghanistan;
- the nature of our relationship with Russia;
- what constitutes an Article 5 threat;
- whether NATO is the principal venue for the security and defense of Europe;
- whether, when and how NATO should continue to enlarge;
- what "solidarity" means in the face of 21st century challenges;

- how much our societies should invest in security and defense; and
- how much NATO should focus inside the Euro-Atlantic area, versus addressing threats that arise far from our own territory.

Rebuilding a firm consensus on these critical issues should be the work of the Strategic Concept. We are lucky to have a person with the stature of a former Secretary of State representing the United States in this process.

For the work of the Strategic Concept to succeed, however, it must become a personal priority for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic – at the Head of State and Cabinet levels. Otherwise, it risks becoming a piece of paper adopted by experts, but without harnessing the genuine political will and commitments to provide the necessary resources from each of the NATO nations.

Specific Areas of Concern

Finally, I would like to make a few observations about some of the specific issues on which Allies are divided. I'll do so in three clusters.

First is Afghanistan. What happens in Afghanistan is vital to the future of NATO, and indeed a test case for NATO. Can it survive in the 21st century or not?

I believe that the attacks on September 11, 2001, and later in Madrid and London, and now the events in in Pakistan today, all show that what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan is vital to the security of the wider region, to Europe, and to the United States. What happens there has a direct effect on our own security.

In addition, the majority of people in Afghanistan and Pakistan want to live in a peaceful society open to improved economic growth, health care, education, human rights, and so forth – but they face an armed enemy hostile to these aspirations and they need our help.

Unfortunately, Allied leaders have seldom made the case to publics about the importance of Afghanistan for European security or human rights. If their own leaders are not explaining the case, publics are understandably deeply skeptical about NATO's efforts there.

And in turn, public skepticism means that many governments seek to minimize what they do in Afghanistan – making “contributions” but not taking “ownership” of the outcome. This applies to European civilian and financial contributions, including through the EU, as well as military contributions.

This is a dangerous situation. By having agreed to the NATO operation, but then in the case of many Allies failing to provide as much civilian, financial and security support as possible and necessary, we risk failure on the ground, failure for NATO, and strain on the solidarity within the transatlantic community. In turn, it will increase temptations within

the United States to conclude that working within NATO, or even working with Europe more generally, is simply not worth the time and effort.

Second is Dealing with Russia, and a host of issues that arise in association with Russia. The emergence of a more authoritarian Russia that seeks a sphere of influence in neighboring states has drawn divergent reactions from Europe.

Central and Eastern Europe, which recently emerged from Soviet domination, seeks strategic reassurance and protection.

Western Europe prefers a strategy of engagement with Russia, in the hopes of winning better Russian behavior.

These two conflicting orientations play out within NATO and elsewhere – on issues such as NATO-Russia relations, Article 5 defense planning, Georgia, Ukraine, CFE, energy, democracy promotion, and the future of NATO and EU enlargement.

In a way, both Central and Western Europe are right. Yet neither Central Europe's demand for protection, nor West Europe's demand for engagement, can succeed alone. Only if we do both simultaneously can we forge a unified transatlantic policy and conduct an effective approach to dealing with Russia and its neighbors.

We need to be firm and clear in our expectations of Russia – especially on democratic values, and on the freedom, sovereignty and independence of Russia's neighbors – while at the same time stressing our desire that Russia be a part of our community, and our desire to work together with Russia in areas of common concern.

There should be no limits to the extent of our cooperation with Russia, provided Russia implements in practice, both at home and in its neighborhood, the same democratic values we expect of ourselves. This is, after all, the genius of the Helsinki Final Act and the foundation of the OSCE.

In the past, the United States has played the role of uniting Europe around a set of policies, and we need to do so again today. I believe this set of policies should include:

- Article 5 defense planning concerning the full range of potential threats facing NATO;
- Continued commitment to the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace – including working actively with countries that seek to join NATO (Montenegro, Bosnia, Georgia, Ukraine) to assist them in implementing necessary reforms; and
- Active engagement with Russia through the NATO-Russia Council wherever common interests make real progress possible.

Third is the way we deal with new threats and challenges. There are those who point to the NATO Treaty and say that NATO is meant to deal only with military attacks

on the territory of NATO members. This view asserts a military and geographically limited view of NATO's collective defense role.

An alternative view, to which I subscribe, is that there are now many more actors and many more means of "attacking" a NATO member today than there were in 1949, yet our obligations to each other for collective defense remain the same.

As Senator Lugar has rightly pointed out, the effects on a society of seeing its energy shut off – deliberately, by an outside actor – can be just as devastating as any military attack.

Thus our view of what can trigger NATO's Article 5 collective defense commitment needs to change. Energy security, cyber-attacks, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and the consequences of failed or weak states, such as in Afghanistan, all have the potential to be Article 5 issues.

And similarly, our view of the ways in which NATO needs to deal with these threats also needs to change. We should not limit our thinking to military force, or to European geography. NATO should develop some civilian capacities – such as police training, which it is already leading in Afghanistan. NATO should work with other organizations and partners as much as possible. And NATO's out-of-area operations – such as in Afghanistan or Iraq or off the coast of Somalia – are not exceptions, but the new norm.

Neither should we limit our thinking to using NATO as the instrument for action just because we use NATO for broad-based strategic coordination. We should be able to use NATO for consultations, and agreement on joint action, even if we also agree that NATO as an instrument will not be in the lead on execution.

U.S.-EU cooperation – as important as it is – is not a substitute for cooperation through NATO. The U.S. is not present in EU discussions, and when the U.S. and EU meet, we do so as partners across a table. NATO is the one place where all sit together around one table, deliberate, and agree common action.

Related to all this is a question of priorities and resources: The U.S. and Europe are diverging on the priority that our societies place on investment in security and defense capacities, and our willingness to use them.

European spending on security and defense as a percentage of GDP is at record lows. European politics drives leaders toward coordination first within Europe, with transatlantic coordination as a far lower priority. Europeans are divided on the use of military force, even when Europe's development, governance, and human rights goals cannot be achieved without the use of force when faced with armed groups such as we see in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

Adopting a common view of these issues – the nature of the threats we face, how they relate to our commitments to each other as Allies, on using NATO for strategic coordination, and on how far we go on using NATO as an integrating mechanism for civil-military efforts – must all be a core part of a new security compact embodied in the Strategic Concept.

Mr. Chairman, the challenges facing NATO today are deep, complex, and extremely difficult to overcome. They threaten the very future of the Alliance. Yet they can be overcome with political will and commitment – and follow-through – on both sides of the Atlantic.

The effort to produce a new Strategic Concept is just getting started. It should be a shared goal for people who prize our democratic values on both sides of the Atlantic that this Strategic Concept rise to the monumental challenge of building a new transatlantic security compact for the 21st century.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing.